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Abstract 
 
 
The year 2010 witnessed a dramatic decline in the US-China relationship, primarily over issues 
related to the Chinese currency, geopolitics, and human rights.   Beijing‟s apparent intransigence over 
these issues led to the perception of China‟s growing assertiveness, prompting Washington to harden 
its stance vis-a-vis Beijing.  As this thesis will show, however, such notions misinterpreted the 
rationale behind Beijing‟s stand over the issues, distorting in the process the true nature of China‟s 
rise.  Consequently, US pressure served only to aggravate tensions between the two countries, 
contributing ultimately to the deterioration in bilateral relations.          
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Introduction 
 
 
China‟s economy has been growing at a rapid pace since the beginning of the reform period in the late 
1970s.  It stands today as the world‟s second largest economy behind the United States (US), having 
surpassed the Japanese economy in 2010 in terms of GDP.
1
  Experts, moreover, have projected that 
the Chinese economy could exceed that of the US as early as 2030, making it currently one of the 
world‟s strongest and fastest developing economies.2  While this has been cause for much celebration 
in Beijing, details of China‟s meteoric rise have left experts in Washington with a more sombre 
impression.  Many have come to view the rise of China as a threat to the existing world order, an 
order which has been led hitherto by the US.
3
  Consequently, politicians, academics, and the media in 
America have all come to question China‟s future motives, focusing primarily on the country‟s 
strategic posture on the world stage.
4
  They search for signs of China‟s intentions in its international 
behaviour, and use this as a means to shape Washington‟s approach towards a rising China.  Such 
                                                          
1
 The New York Times, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy (15 Aug 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html?pagewanted=1, viewed 20 August, 2011. 
 
2
 China Daily, China Set to be Top Economy by 2030 (24 Mar 2011), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/ business/ 
2011-03/24/content_12220043.htm, viewed 25 May, 2011. 
 
3
 Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People‟s Republic Targets America (Washington D.C.: Regnery 
Publishing Inc., 2002); Peter Navarro, The Coming China Wars: Where They Will be Fought and How They Can 
be Won (New Jersey: FT Press, 2008): These two books are but a fraction of the literature that spans the topic of 
a rising “China threat”, a topic so large that it forms a distinct genre of Chinese strategic and international 
studies.  Writers belonging to this genre, such as Gertz and Navarro, generally project the inevitability of 
conflict between the US and China.  They also tend to assert, moreover, that the progression towards conflict is 
already currently underway.  They point to China‟s military build up – both conventionally and in its space and 
cyber warfare programmes – as evidence of this, and argue that the incompatibility of each side‟s national 
ideologies preclude possibilities for compromise and peace.  At the same time, China‟s economic system, which 
emphasises its export-driven manufacturing sector, is blamed for the losses of jobs in America and the erosion 
of Washington‟s economic power.  This, “China threat” theorists argue, stands likewise as evidence of China‟s 
hostile intentions towards the US, heralding America‟s coming conflict with China. 
 
4
 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011); Evelyn Goh, „US Strategic Relations with a Rising China: Trajectories 
and Impacts on Asia-Pacific Security‟, in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato, eds., The Rise of China and 
International Security (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 59-93; Kevin J. Cooney, „Chinese-American 
Hegemonic Competition in East Asia: A New Cold War or into the Arms of America?‟, in Kevin J. Cooney and 
Yoichiro Sato, eds., The Rise of China and International Security (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 38-58;  
James Kynge, China Shakes the World: The Rise of a Hungry Nation (London: Phoenix, 2009): China‟s rise is 
typically portrayed as having a great impact on its neighbours, as well as the world‟s leading nation, the US.  
Commentators, however, are often split on the nature of China‟s impact and the way countries should react to 
China‟s rise.  While some see engagement as the way forward, others see “containment” as the best means to 
prevent Beijing from altering the existing US-led global order. 
6 
 
measures, however, often fail to take into account the real reasons that inform Beijing‟s behaviour, 
leading, as this paper will show, to serious miscalculations in the bilateral relationship.  Ultimately, 
such miscalculations distort the true picture behind China‟s rise, making instead for a scenario of 
mutual suspicion and controversy. 
 
One result of these miscalculations is the growing perception in Washington of China‟s increasing 
assertiveness, an impression that was made especially acute through the course of 2010.
5
  Over that 
year, three issues in particular emerged that brought both countries into contention, contributing 
ultimately to the deterioration in their bilateral relationship.  Firstly, Washington began pressuring 
China to increase the value of its currency, the Renminbi (RMB), in a bid to reduce the US‟s 
escalating trade deficit.  The RMB, economists in Washington argued, was being manipulated to 
boost Chinese exports, hampering in the process America‟s post-GFC recovery.6  US officials were 
thus highly critical of Beijing‟s currency regime and censured Chinese leaders in numerous high level 
meetings.
7
  At the same time, Congress began issuing a series of bills in retaliation to the RMB‟s 
apparent “misalignment”, promising to punish Chinese exports with countervailing duties.  These 
actions, however, ultimately failed to bring about any concessions from Beijing, fuelling as a result 
perceptions of China‟s growing intransigence.  Consequently, the US became even more vocal on the 
issue with Beijing, aggravating further the already tense relationship.
8
 
 
                                                          
5
 Thomas J. Christensen, „The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing‟s Abrasive 
Diplomacy‟, Foreign Affairs, 90, no. 2 (March 2011), pp. 54-67; Peter Navarro (and Greg Autry), Death by 
China: Confronting the Dragon – A Global call to Action (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2011). 
 
6
 Financial Times, US Shows Appetite for Action (23 Mar 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/a63e5a62-3697-11df-
b810-00144feabdc0.html, viewed 10 March, 2011; The New York Times, An Overlooked Way to Create Jobs 
(28 Sep 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/opinion/an-overlooked-way-to-create-jobs.html?_r=1&ref= 
todayspaper, viewed 30 September, 2011: More recently, with US unemployment rates remaining high, and 
with the threat of another recession looming, economists, such as Fred Bergsten, are once again drawing 
attention to China‟s currency. 
 
7
 The New York Times, Obama Ends G-20 Summit with Criticism of China (12 Nov 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/11/13/business/global/13group.html?ref=yuan, viewed 17 March, 2011. 
 
8
 Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, pp. 112-15. 
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Secondly, Beijing‟s response to North Korea‟s alleged sinking of the South Korean warship, the 
ROKS Cheonan, likewise became a subject of great controversy.  Officials in Washington had 
expected Beijing to support their efforts to censure Pyongyang for its perceived role in the sinking, 
but were left deeply disappointed with China‟s reaction.  Not only did Beijing continue to host the 
North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Il, in numerous state visits, but it also promised to increase economic 
relations between the two countries.
9
  Consequently, US officials saw this conciliatory approach as 
counterproductive to peace on the Korean Peninsula and stepped-up its pressure on the Chinese.  They 
held military exercises off the Chinese coast with its allies in the region, and deployed an aircraft 
carrier into the Yellow Sea.
10
  At the same time, Washington began strengthening its military relations 
with countries along China‟s borders in an unmistakable move to pressurise Beijing.  All this 
achieved, however, was to increase the strategic threat perceptions of the Chinese, hardening 
Beijing‟s resolve to resist US entreaties.  Ultimately, this deadlock over the issue contributed to the 
declining relationship between the two countries, and added to Washington‟s impression of China‟s 
growing assertiveness.      
 
Lastly, US pressure on China‟s human rights record began to intensify following the awarding of the 
2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, a vocal critique of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP).  His recent imprisonment by Beijing on charges of sedition was described as unjust by 
US officials, who then went on to call for his immediate release.
11
  They identified Liu‟s criticisms of 
the Chinese government as being in line with his rights to free speech, and thus labelled his 
incarceration as a travesty to justice.
12
  The White House subsequently issued a series of statements 
condemning Beijing‟s actions, and urged the Party to implement liberal reforms to its authoritarian 
                                                          
9
 Bates Gill, „China‟s North Korea Policy: Assessing Interests and Influences‟, United States Institute of Peace, 
Special  report 283 (Jul 2011), pp. 4-6. 
 
10
 Christensen, „The Advantages of an Assertive China‟, pp. 54-55. 
 
11
 US State Department, Nobel Peace Prize Awarded to Liu Xiaobo (8 Oct 2010), http://www.state.gov/ 
secretary/rm/2010/10/149235.htm, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
12 The New York Times, Leading China Dissident gets 11-Year Term for Subversion (25 Dec 2009), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/25/world/asia/25china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 20 June, 2011. 
8 
 
politics.
13
  Chinese leaders, however, viewed the Nobel award as an attack on China‟s political 
sovereignty, and thus refused to accommodate US requests to set Liu free.  Beijing, moreover, issued 
repeated appeals to numerous countries, warning them against attending Liu‟s award ceremony.  The 
controversy surrounding the Nobel Prize, therefore, became the subject of heated contention between 
Washington and Beijing, straining ties between the two countries.  More importantly, Beijing‟s 
response to Liu‟s award was perceived by Washington as a sign of China‟s growing international 
assertiveness, fuelling notions in America of a looming threat from the Chinese.
14
    
 
In all three areas, Beijing‟s apparent inflexibility to Washington‟s demands invited the impression of 
China‟s rising assertiveness, intensifying in the process existing “China threat” theories.  As will be 
argued in this paper, however, such conclusions remain woefully inaccurate, especially as they make 
little attempt to confront the realities behind Beijing‟s stand on these issues.  In his criticism of 
China‟s currency policies, for instance, economist Peter Navarro accused China of deliberately 
seeking to weaken the American economy.
15
  This, he claimed, was part of a grand scheme to 
challenge Washington‟s international leadership, with Beijing aiming in the long run to assert its own 
global authority.
16
   Similarly, expert Stefan Halper declared the inevitability of a confrontation 
between Washington and a rising China, highlighting their differing values as a flashpoint for 
conflict.
17
  Beijing‟s apparent disregard for the issue of human rights, he argued, would propel China 
into a clash with America, with the former seeking to reshape the existing US-centric world order.
18
  
                                                          
13
 The New York Times, Obama Pushes Hu on Rights but Stresses Ties to China (19 Jan 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/world/asia/20prexy.html?ref=freedomandhumanrights&gwh=420E78F434
B0CA2F4CEA822CCD2CCAD3, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
14 Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus (New York: Basic Books, 2010), pp. 2-3: Part of the “China threat” 
comes from the spread of the “Beijing consensus”, a term coined by Halper to describe the growing appeal of 
China‟s authoritarian-led capitalist system of government amongst third world countries.  This, he argues, is 
slowly rolling back the appeal of the “Washington consensus”, the democratic system of governance promoted 
by the US. 
 
15
 Navarro, Death by China, pp. 67-76. 
 
16
 Ibid., pp. 2-6, 233-60. 
 
17
 Halper, The Beijing Consensus, pp. 2-3, 72-73, 139-40. 
 
18
 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
9 
 
Seen through this lens, Liu‟s imprisonment was just the first step in the emergence of a new “Beijing 
consensus”, one that would be defined by China‟s refutation of human rights and democracy.  
Halper‟s thesis, however, as in the case for many other “China threat” theories, was based solely on 
Washington‟s perspectives of a rising China, misrepresenting in the process the vital standpoint of 
China‟s authorities.   
 
In seeking to rectify this discrepancy, this paper will show that Beijing‟s actions were guided, in fact, 
by its perception of a driving need to preserve China‟s stability, rather than the aim of challenging 
America‟s supremacy.  With the country still in the midst of extensive socioeconomic reforms, and 
with Beijing on the verge of a leadership change in 2012, the country has recently entered into a 
highly sensitive period of development.
19
  The CCP can thus ill-afford any move that would 
jeopardise the continued growth of the Chinese economy, which would put in risk the Party‟s political 
legitimacy.  The preservation of its position as China‟s ruling authority has always been Beijing‟s 
upmost priority and, hence, this, more than anything else, represented the rationale behind China‟s 
reticence in the three issues.  The failure of US analysts to comprehend this, however, served only to 
reinforce theories of China‟s growing assertiveness, intensifying in turn Washington‟s paranoia over a 
rising China.  In the end, it was this miscalculation that guided US pressure on the three issues, 
aggravating the bilateral relationship with Beijing.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Li Cheng, „China‟s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing up for 2012‟, China Leadership Monitor, no. 31 (2010), pp. 
1-24: With as many as 60 percent of the current leadership expected to step down at the 18
th
 National Party 
Congress in 2012, it has been argued that China has now entered into a period of political sensitivity. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
Currency Wars: A Sign of China‟s Growing Assertiveness? 
 
 
Issues related to the value of the Renminbi (RMB) contributed to the decline in US-China relations 
throughout 2010.
20
  During this period, pressure from various US sources increased dramatically, 
culminating in the introduction of thirteen Congressional bills related to the currency‟s apparent 
misalignment [Appendix A.].  Still suffering from the effects of the GFC, and with the trade deficit 
and unemployment rates surging, the Obama administration began to single out the undervaluing of 
the RMB increasingly as the cause for the country‟s economic woes.21  Pressure mounted on Chinese 
authorities to bring about a sharper and more rapid realignment of their currency, pursuant to US 
estimates of the RMB‟s appropriate exchange rate.  At the same time, US public opinion regarding 
China became ever more adversarial, and interest groups and the media augmented the chorus of 
voices that sought greater concessions from Beijing.
22
  Often confrontational in tone and 
uncompromising in nature, US pressure created an allusion of a “currency war” between the two 
nations.
23
  Congress‟s attempts to penalise China‟s traders through countervailing duties sparked fears 
                                                          
20
 Benjamin I. Page (and Tao Xie), „The Complexities of Economic Soft Power: The U.S.-China Case‟, in Sook 
Jong Lee and Jan Melissen, eds., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), pp. 226-36; Wayne M. Morrison (and Marc Labonte), „China‟s Currency: An Analysis of the 
Economic Issues‟, Congressional Research Service (12 Jan, 2011), pp. 1, 6, 8-11; Leon T. Hader, „Mr. Hu Goes 
to Washington‟, Cato Institute (18 Jan 2011), http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12711, viewed 24 
March, 2011; Steve H. Hanke, „American‟s „Plan‟ to Destabilise China‟, Cato Institute (21 Oct 2010), 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12492, viewed 24 March, 2011; Stefan Halper, The Beijing 
Consensus (New York: Basic Books, 2010), pp. 188-95. 
 
21
 Morrison, „China‟s Currency‟, p. 1; Wayne Bert, „Assessing China: The Obama Administration Looks at a 
Rising Power‟ (23 February 2011), pp. 37-42. 
 
22
 Bert, „Assessing China‟, pp. 41-42; Sung Eun Kim , „How Publics Feel Toward the Rise of China?: A 
Comparative Study of Public Opinion in Japan, South Korea, and the US‟, Annual Meeting of the International 
Studies Association (February 2010), pp. 1-25: Sung‟s study reveals that 75 percent of Americans are 
uncomfortable with China‟s economic rise and support a US-led “containment” strategy. 
 
23
 Charles Wolf Jr., „A Smarter Approach to the Yuan‟, Policy Review, no. 166 (April, 2011), p. 6; Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Op-ed: China‟s Currency and the US Economy (1 Nov 2010), 
http://www.piie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=1700, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
11 
 
of similar retaliatory measures by Chinese authorities.
24
  Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve‟s 
quantitative easing practices came to be regarded by Beijing as a form of trade protectionism, 
aggravating the already tense climate for diplomacy.
25
  Chinese leaders, moreover, issued heated 
warnings against the politicisation of the RMB, describing the issue as a prerogative of Chinese 
sovereignty.
26
  This resistance, however, only served to fuel the US‟s perceptions of an increasingly 
assertive China, escalating diplomatic tensions further into the first quarter of 2011.  
 
While much has been written about US assessments of the RMB dispute, Beijing‟s views have been 
less documented outside China.
27
  The reaction of Chinese leaders to US pressure, in particular, has 
been surprisingly overlooked, contributing to misconceptions that led to the decline in the bilateral 
relationship.  China‟s intransigence, as this chapter will show, stemmed not from a position of power, 
but from a sense of insecurity.  Fuelled by escalating socioeconomic tensions like income inequality, 
the CCP embarked on an extensive restructuring of China‟s economy in a bid to strengthen 
confidence in the Party.
28
  Stability was regarded as a vital element of the plan‟s long-term success, 
and officials were thus reluctant to make sharp adjustments to the RMB.  US pressure was seen, 
                                                          
24
 Hader, „Mr. Hu‟. 
 
25
 China Daily, Wen Stands Firm on Yuan (15 Mar 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-
03/15/content_11016842.htm, viewed 14 March, 2011; Ministry of Commerce of the People‟s Republic of 
China, China to Increase Flexibility of the RMB Exchange Rate (20 Mar 2011), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/counselorsoffice/westernasiaandafricareport/201103/2011030
7455972.html, viewed 5 April, 2011.  
 
26People‟s Daily Online, President Hu Pledges Currency Reform (25 May 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6997598.html, viewed 4 March, 2011. 
 
27
 Morris Goldstein (and Nicholas Lardy), „China‟s Exchange Rate Policy: An Overview of Some Key Issues‟, 
in Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, eds., Debating China‟s Exchange Rate Policy (Washington: Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, 2008), pp. 1-60; Gary C. Hufbauer (and Claire Brunel), „The US Congress 
and the Chinese Renminbi‟,  in Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, eds., Debating China‟s exchange Rate 
Policy (Washington: Peterson Institute for international Economics, 2008), pp. 219-33; Christoph Herrmann, 
„Don Yuan: China‟s “Selfish” Exchange Rate Policy and International Economic Law‟, in C. Hermann and J. P. 
Terhechte, eds., European Yearbook of international Economic Law 2010 (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2010), pp. 
31-51; Page, „The Complexities‟, pp. 226-36: Economists and academics generally view the RMB issue from 
the US‟s perspective, concentrating their discussions on US employment issues, economic recovery, 
administrative and Congressional pressure, and the bilateral trade imbalance.  When Beijing has been 
mentioned, it is only within the context of its exporting competitiveness and accretion of its foreign reserves.  
 
28
 Stephen S. Roach, „China‟s 12th Five Year Plan: Strategy vs. Tactics‟, Morgan Stanley (March, 2011), pp. 1-
9; Barry Naughton, „China‟s Economic Policy Today: The New State Activism‟, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 52, no. 3 (2011), pp. 313-29. 
12 
 
therefore, as an intrusion on Beijing‟s core interests, and this demanded a firm response.29  As each 
side adopted uncompromising positions, tensions rose, and Beijing became convinced of the existence 
of a US “containment” strategy.  It led Premier Wen Jiabao to assert that the US‟s „real motive 
[behind its pressure] was to contain China‟ – a perception shared by many within the Chinese policy 
making community.
30
   
 
 
Washington Sees Red: US Pressure on the RMB (2010-2011) 
 
As scholars have often pointed out, the main source of economic friction between China and the US 
in 2010 stemmed from their expanding bilateral trade deficit.
31
  This figure had increased from 
US$226 billion in 2009 to US$273 billion in 2010, resulting from the surge in US imports from China 
following the latter‟s stronger post-GFC recovery.32  While the White House had been more tolerant 
of this trade imbalance in the past, the sluggish recovery of the US economy meant that, by 2010, 
Washington had drastically altered its economic and political priorities.
33
  Reducing soaring 
unemployment rates had become the most important goal of the Obama administration, and, as a 
consequence, the trade deficit came under ever increasing scrutiny.
34
  It was blamed for the loss of 
                                                          
29
 John Naisbitt (and Doris Naisbitt), China‟s Megatrends: The 8 Pillars of a New Society (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2010): Unjustified accusations, in particular, are thought to draw strong reactions from the 
Chinese; People‟s Daily Online, Analysts Say China Should Not Yield to Obama‟s Hardline on Yuan (9 Feb 
2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6891455.html, viewed 4 March, 2011: China would 
declare on numerous occasions throughout 2010 that pressure would not affect the rate of RMB reform. 
 
30
 China Daily, What‟s Behind US Pressure on Renminbi Exchange Rate? (20 Feb 2010), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-02/20/content_9476381.htm, viewed 20 February, 2011; People‟s 
Daily Online, “Yuan Exchange Rate Issue” Only Western Countries‟ Excuse for Low Competitiveness (9 Mar 
2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90859/ 6913537.html, viewed 4 March, 2011; People‟s Daily 
Online, RMB Appreciation Pressure Harmful to Interests of China, EU (9 Oct 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91421/7161021.html, viewed 9 March, 2011. 
 
31
 Daniel J. Ikenson, „China Trade and American Jobs‟, Cato Institute (2 Apr, 2010), http://www.cato.org/ 
pub_display.php?pub_id=11652, viewed 23 March, 2011; Stephen S. Roach, „The Politics of Trade Frictions‟, 
in Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, eds., Debating China‟s Exchange Rate Policy (Washington: Peterson 
Institute for international Economics, 2008), pp. 235-37. 
 
32
 Morrison, „China‟s Currency‟, p. 6. 
 
33
 Financial Times, US Shows Appetite for Action (23 Mar 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/a63e5a62-3697-
11df-b810-00144feabdc0.html, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
34
 Morrison, „China‟s Currency‟, p. 1. 
13 
 
more than a million US jobs, particularly within the manufacturing sector, and US economists 
advocated the adoption of tougher measures vis-à-vis Beijing‟s trading policies.35  Financial experts, 
such as Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute, testified to the detrimental effects of the imbalance on 
US employment rates, and pressed the administration for measures that could reduce the size of the 
deficit.
36
  Central to their arguments was Beijing‟s apparent manipulation of its currency regime, a 
practice that essentially altered the competitiveness of China‟s exporting industries.37   
 
According to the calculations of economists, such as Paul Krugman and William Cline, the RMB had 
been undervalued by as much as 24 percent against the dollar in 2010, effectively serving as a trade 
subsidy for Chinese exports to the US.
38
  This also meant that US exports faced the disadvantage of 
artificial tariffs in China, resulting in the pricing out of certain US industries from the Chinese market.  
US manufacturers, therefore, could not compete with the influx of low-cost Chinese goods, and many 
were forced to close or downsize their enterprises.
39
  In a period where monthly unemployment rates 
were regularly exceeding 10 percent, restoring US jobs could have potentially acted as a boost to the 
ailing economy.
40
  Furthermore, with the public‟s attention fixed firmly on the economy, progress in 
this area would have represented a significant victory for the government.
41
   Attaining Chinese 
                                                          
35
 Ibid.; The New York Times, Taking On China (30 Sep 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/ 
opinion/01krugman.html?scp=1&sq=taking%20on%20china&st=cse, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
36
 Peterson Institute for International Economics, Op-ed: Beijing is Key to Creating more US Jobs (14 Apr 
2010), http://www.piie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=1545, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
37
 The New York Times, China Rejects US Complaints on its Currency (4 Feb 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/02/05/world/asia/05diplo.html?ref=yuan, viewed 17 march, 2011. 
 
38
 Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief: Estimates of Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange 
Rates, May 2010 (Jun 2010), http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb10-15.pdf, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
39
 The New York Times, Rapid Declines in Manufacturing Spread Global Anxiety (19 Mar 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/business/worldbusiness/20shrink.html?scp=1&sq=US+manufacturing+sec
tor+&st=nyt, viewed 21 April, 2011; The New York Times, For Small Employers, Shedding Workers and Tears 
(6 May 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/07/us/07layoff.html?scp=13&sq=manufacturing+sector+ 
worst+hit&st=nyt, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
40
 Gallup, Gallup Daily: US Employment, http://www.gallup.com/poll/125639/Gallup-Daily-Workforce.aspx, 
viewed 18 July, 2011. 
 
41
 Gallup, Economy, Jobs Easily Top Problems in Americans‟ Minds (21 Sep 2010), http://www. 
gallup.com/poll/143135/Economy-Jobs-Easily-Top-Problems-Americans-Minds.aspx, viewed 24 June, 2011. 
14 
 
cooperation over the RMB therefore became a fundamental goal of the administration, and many 
supported the adoption of tough, counteractive measures against Beijing.   
 
In his 2010 State of the Union Address, President Obama made it clear that his top priorities were the 
revitalisation of the US economy and the creation of new jobs.
42
  Promising to double American 
exports by 2015, he also vowed to get „much tougher‟ on trading partners over issues of currency 
manipulation.
43
  He described the RMB as being artificially undervalued in a meeting with Premier 
Wen, and acknowledged the role it played in worsening the bilateral trade imbalance.
44
  This, he 
stressed, had cost the US thousands of jobs, and as such, had to be remedied immediately.  At the 
2010 G-20 Summit in Seoul, Obama raised the issue of China‟s currency with President Hu Jintao and 
criticised the Chinese for their irresponsible trading policies.
45
  With the RMB in mind, the US 
delegation pushed for the implementation of a framework that would reduce trade imbalances over 
given lengths of time, utilising the multilateral platform to increase pressure on the Chinese.
46
  
Echoing other voices within his administration, Obama also insisted that the Chinese appreciate the 
RMB more rapidly.
47
 He expressed his dissatisfaction with Beijing‟s currency reform efforts during 
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Hu‟s visit to the US in 2011, and issued a statement shortly after calling for the creation of a „level 
playing field for American companies‟.48   
 
Concern over the pace of Beijing‟s reforms was also expressed by the US Treasury in the 
department‟s biannual exchange rate reports to Congress.  Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner 
blamed the undervalued RMB for the loss of US jobs, and called for greater progress to be made on 
the issue.
49
  While the reports failed to officially identify China as a “currency manipulator”, they did 
express the administration‟s sense of urgency over the matter, stressing the repercussions which an 
undervalued currency had on global economic recovery.
50
  The Chinese, the documents asserted, were 
putting undue pressure on the economies of other countries like the US, forcing them to bear the 
burden of exchange rate adjustments to the detriment of their industries.  Geithner therefore 
recommended that China assume its role as a responsible trading partner and accelerate the reform of 
its currency.
51
  Although the department lacked its own enforcement measures to guarantee Chinese 
cooperation, Geithner‟s reports nevertheless contributed to the administration‟s growing pressure on 
Beijing.  The Treasury ensured that the spotlight remained firmly fixed on China and the RMB, and 
kept the currency issue from slipping under the political radar.
52
  Moreover, it called attention to 
Beijing‟s extensive intervention in its financial markets, and promoted the impression of China‟s 
status as an economic pariah.
53
  This capacity to “name and shame”, therefore, made the Treasury an 
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important part of the administration‟s diplomatic arsenal, confirming its vital role in the US‟s efforts 
at maintaining „constant pressure‟ on Beijing.   
 
The strongest and most boisterous source of pressure emanating from the US, however, emerged from 
Capitol Hill.  Between April 2009 and June 2011, fourteen bills related to China‟s currency 
undervaluation were presented to Congress for deliberation.  Identifying the RMB as the main cause 
for the US-China trade deficit, the bills demanded that the White House press Beijing for a sharp and 
immediate appreciation of their currency.
54
  Many of the bills contained stipulations that promised 
retaliatory actions in the event of Beijing‟s noncompliance, mandating the use of countervailing duties 
to penalise the Chinese.
55
  Bills such as H.R. 1603 and S. 1982, moreover, proposed the creation of 
special commissions to rectify US trade imbalances with countries like China, highlighting the 
detrimental effects such relationships had on US industries.
56
  These bills obtained bipartisan 
sponsorship, and were fiercely backed by members of the US manufacturing lobby.
57
  Yet, in spite of 
such strong support, the dubious legality of the penalties under WTO regulations ensured that none of 
the bills achieved successful outcomes.
58
   
 
The potency of the bills, however, was located not in their provisions but in their ability to draw 
attention to the currency issue.
59
  As Senator Charles Schumer claimed, they were meant more as 
“wakeup calls” than actual attempts at legislation; and from that perspective, the bills were essentially 
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a success.
60
  Bills such as H.R. 2378, which attained a 348 to 79 margin of approval in the House of 
Representatives in 2010, served as clear signals of Congress‟s tone over the RMB problem.61  And 
these signals were meant just as much for the White House as they were for Beijing.  The 
overwhelming result compelled Obama to increase the pressure on China by publicly addressing 
Congress‟s concerns, cautioning the Chinese of Washington‟s growing impatience over the matter.62  
Similarly, H.R 2378 also elicited strong reactions from Beijing, drawing objections from both the 
Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
63
  Hence, while Congress‟s currency bills 
initially appeared to be more bark than bite, they were nevertheless crucial at influencing the level of 
pressure exerted on the Chinese.  Moreover, with congressional hearings highly publicised across 
various channels of the media, the bills also helped shape popular discourses surrounding the RMB.
64
  
Already, by January 2011, more than 50 percent of Americans favoured tougher economic actions 
against China, while 47 percent expressed apprehension over the growing power of the Chinese.
65
  
The impact of Congress over Washington and the wider public, therefore, ensured its crucial role in 
the shaping of US-China policy, establishing the currency issue as one of the administration‟s top 
political priorities. 
 
With the manufacturing sector suffering some of the worst effects of the GFC, lobbying groups, such 
as the US Business and Industry Council, came to represent yet another source of pressure on 
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Beijing.
66
  Speaking for companies like Evergreen, a solar panel producer that was forced to close its 
Massachusetts factory in 2011, the manufacturing lobby drew attention to the effects of China‟s 
currency policies on the US‟s ailing job market.67  Coupled with the findings of policy organizations, 
like the Peterson Institute, these interest groups provided politicians with strong incentives to engage 
in currency debates on Capitol Hill.  The protection of US jobs, for instance, constantly formed the 
rationale behind currency bills introduced in Congress; while Beijing became consistently linked with 
the US‟s deteriorating industries.  In the context of declining public sentiment over China, interest 
groups and their representatives heightened the confrontational atmosphere with their rhetoric, 
stressing the need to adopt more aggressive measures against the Chinese.  From plans to impose 
taxes on China‟s Treasury holdings, to elaborate plots involving indirect purchases of RMB, 
advocates sought various means to intensify the pressure on Beijing.
68
  Forming coalitions amongst 
similarly aggrieved manufacturers, they represented a strong front in the currency war that was 
shaping between the two countries.
69
  Their influence over the RMB debate, therefore, ensured that 
interest groups played a crucial role in affecting political pressure on Beijing.    
 
By the means of direct high level diplomacy, and through the constant vigilance of the US Treasury, 
the administration was therefore able to sustain pressure on Beijing all through 2010.  Furthermore, 
Congress ensured that the currency issue remained a top priority in the White House‟s political 
agenda, introducing a multitude of currency bills between 2009 and 2011.  Fiercely supported by 
policy institutes and lobbying groups, these bills helped to shape and sustain public interest over the 
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RMB issue.  With unemployment rates near record highs, and popular attention firmly fixed over 
matters of the economy, China became increasingly blamed for the U.S‟s anaemic recovery.  Talk of 
“China bashing” emerged in the media, and the heightened pressure strained US relations with 
Beijing.  As the next section will show, Chinese leaders became ever more wary of the political 
climate in Washington, interpreting the confrontational atmosphere as signs of a US “containment” 
strategy.  At the same time, China‟s reluctance to accommodate US demands added to the air of 
mutual distrust in the relationship, contributing to a drastic decline in ties between the two countries. 
 
 
Beijing Blues: Chinese Resistance to US Pressure (2010-2011) 
 
Throughout the period of 2010 to early 2011, a host of official statements emerged from Beijing in 
response to mounting US pressure over the RMB.  While admitting that some readjustment to the 
exchange rate was needed to help control spiralling inflation, Chinese leaders were nonetheless 
resolute in their maintenance of a gradualist approach at appreciation.
70
  Their motivations for 
resisting US pressure stemmed from domestic concerns, and can be largely grouped into three 
categories that define the internal interests of the CCP.  Firstly, exchange rate reforms were depicted 
as part of Beijing‟s wider objective of economic restructuring, and were thus contingent on the 
progression of this aim.  The US‟s focus on the RMB was regarded as unjustified and structural 
remedies were proffered instead as a means of resolving imbalances between the two countries.  
Secondly, the need to maintain socio-economic stability represented the Party‟s paramount concern, 
especially since it bore directly on the CCP‟s political legitimacy.  Jobs in the export sector, therefore, 
had to be protected from shocks caused by sudden and rapid appreciations in the RMB.  Lastly, 
Chinese leaders viewed the currency issue as a matter of national sovereignty.  Washington‟s attempts 
to politicise the RMB were thus regarded as incursions into the internal affairs of the Party, rousing 
suspicions of a US “containment strategy”.   
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Though the subject of RMB revaluation has been fiercely debated over recent years outside of China, 
a consensus has yet to be reached within academic circles.
71
  Economists, for instance, have argued 
over the degree of the RMB‟s undervaluation, producing wide variations in estimates of the 
currency‟s equilibrium exchange rate.72  A 2008 analysis of the existing literature, conducted by 
William Cline and John Williamson, illustrated the complexities involved in calculating the RMB‟s 
appropriate value.  Their conclusion, after reviewing various methodologies, revealed the wide margin 
for error in designating an appropriate revaluation rate.
73
  At the same time, scholars have disputed the 
effectiveness of appreciation on reducing the US-China trade deficit, bringing into question 
Washington‟s fixation over the subject.  IMF economist Olivier Blanchard, for instance, pointed to 
China‟s high savings rate as the main cause for the deficit, and supported Beijing‟s macroeconomic 
reforms as the solution to the imbalance.
74
  Others, like Daniel Ikenson of the Cato Institute, 
emphasised the high price-inelasticity of Chinese goods as a reason against rapid revaluation.
75
  
Appreciation, he argued, would only raise the prices of Chinese consumer goods without dampening 
demand, thereby hurting US consumers who depended on these imports.  More importantly, US 
businesses that relied on Chinese imports would face steeper costs, exacerbating, instead of 
improving, the country‟s unemployment crisis.76  
 
The ambiguity surrounding currency revaluation solidified Beijing‟s resolve to approach appreciation 
gradually.  Chinese leaders such as Premier Wen made public statements denying the undervaluation 
of the RMB, while the Commerce Ministry insisted that structural factors lay behind the US‟s trade 
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deficit.
77
  Furthermore, with the implementation of long-term initiatives to develop a consumption-
driven economy, Chinese officials argued that even these structural factors would begin to diminish 
eventually.
78
  The expansion of the social safety net, for instance, was expected to raise the purchasing 
power of households, while the development of the services sector and special industries would help 
increase wages and lower corporate savings.
79
  These measures, explained officials from the National 
Development and Reform Commission, would decrease dependency on exports and rebalance the 
Chinese economy.
80
  Imports were anticipated to rise, leading to a gradual reduction in the bilateral 
imbalance.  The US‟s focus on the RMB was thus interpreted in Beijing as not only unnecessary, but 
also counterproductive.
81
  It heightened the risk of speculative inflows of “hot money” into China, and 
increased inflationary pressures in the country.
82
  Additionally, as economist Dai Meixing argued, it 
served to complicate monetary control policies of the PBOC, threatening the stable and rapid growth 
of the Chinese economy.
83
  State officials were therefore wary of US pressure on the RMB, believing 
that they were already doing their part to resolve imbalances between the two countries.
84
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Stability was essential in Beijing‟s goal of economic restructuring.85  Hence, jobs in the export sector 
had to be cushioned from the effects of RMB appreciation.  While Chinese manufacturers could adapt 
to a 5 to 6 percent readjustment annually, anything more was judged to be detrimental to their profit 
margins.
86
  With wages and commodity prices rising, enterprises already faced strong downward 
pressures on their earnings.
87
  A sharp appreciation, officials argued, would force businesses to close 
down, leading to a surge in unemployment that could destabilise the country.
88
  Beijing had only just 
recovered from the effects of the GFC, during which unemployment rates escalated into the double 
digits.
89
  Millions of urban workers had been laid-off, and companies began to cut back on hiring.  By 
2009, there already appeared to be a backlog of college graduates who were unemployed.
90
  The 
government could thus barely afford a new wave of foreclosures that would increase employment 
pressures in the cities.  Since the Party‟s legitimacy was intimately linked to its ability to improve the 
livelihood of its people, a failure to keep unemployment rates in check could potentially turn into a 
catastrophe.  Maintaining fast and stable growth in the economy was therefore regarded as an 
imperative by the CCP.     
 
With this concern in mind, Chinese leaders stressed that RMB appreciation would only push low 
paying jobs from China to other developing economies, leaving the US‟s unemployment situation 
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unresolved.
91
  Global recovery, they maintained, would be better served by the stable and sustained 
growth of the Chinese economy; a process that would be impeded by sudden fluctuations in the 
RMB.
92
  Supporting this view, the American Chamber of Commerce in China acknowledged that 
rising production costs was starting to become an issue of concern for its affiliated companies.
93
  
Currency appreciation, it claimed, would curb China‟s competitiveness, forcing enterprises to relocate 
to other developing countries.  With Beijing in the midst of developing a consumption-driven 
economy, officials could ill-afford a massive flight of capital investment.  The fate of the global 
recovery, argued the Ministry of Commerce, depended on the successful transformation of China‟s 
growth model and the stability of the RMB.
94
  Furthermore, noted officials, a rebalancing of trade had 
already begun to occur as a result of Beijing‟s initiatives, with China incurring a first quarter trade 
deficit of US$1.02 billion in 2011.
95
  US pressure was thus perceived as misguided, aiming only to 
solve America‟s immediate problems at the expanse of the Chinese economy.   
 
The perception that the US was acting in its own self-interest accrued a broad following within the 
Chinese leadership.  Officials, such as Vice-Finance Minister Li Yong, reiterated the view that the US 
was attempting to limit China‟s development through pressure on the RMB.96  Likewise, Premier Wen 
identified the Federal Reserve‟s quantitative easing policies as an act of US protectionism, stressing 
that it not only raised inflationary pressures in China, but also devalued Beijing‟s holdings of US 
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Treasuries.
97
  Chinese assets, he reminded Washington, represented the investment of the people‟s 
money; their management was thus regarded as a matter of national sovereignty.
98
  It was also 
hypocritical for the US to demand the appreciation of the RMB, while simultaneously depreciating its 
own currency.
99
  This, warned Premier Wen, amounted to “containment”, and symbolised a major 
stumbling block in the bilateral relationship.
100
  Indeed, many within the policy making community 
had already arrived at the same opinion, leading to increased misgivings over US intentions with 
Beijing.  Vice-Commerce Minister Zhong Shan asserted that US assessments of China were „a legacy 
of the Cold War‟, and were thus unfair and inaccurate.101  Barriers preventing the sale of high-tech, 
dual-use technologies to Chinese firms, he argued, were built around the notion of a China threat, 
contributing needlessly to the US‟s bilateral trade deficit.  More importantly, it heightened distrust 
between the two countries, and empowered hawkish sentiments in Beijing.  Academics, such as Li 
Daokui and Shi Jianxun, were already adopting inflammatory rhetoric, describing China‟s resistance 
over the RMB as a battle to „resist American hegemony‟.102 
 
Hence, US pressure on the RMB had a profound impact on the Chinese leadership over the past year, 
contributing to the emergence of widespread “containment” anxieties.  Heightening just after the 
GFC, currency pressures intersected with Beijing‟s attempts to restructure China‟s economy.  While 
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domestic imperatives drove the US administration to increase pressure on the Chinese, the CCP‟s own 
objectives precluded any acquiescence over the RMB.  Rather than risk the instabilities involved with 
currency adjustment, Chinese leaders opted to rely on macroeconomic reforms to rebalance bilateral 
trade discrepancies.  Crucial to this decision was the gradual and controlled revaluation of the RMB, 
necessary to ensure the emergence of a consumption-driven economy.  From Beijing‟s perspective, 
therefore, China had already adopted measures designed to reduce trade imbalances, making US 
pressure both unwarranted and hypocritical.  President Hu criticised the US‟s propensity to „blame 
others for its own problems‟, advising Washington to turn its attention to its own macroeconomic 
deficiencies.
103
  Statements such as these, however, led to impressions of China‟s growing 
assertiveness, inflating narratives of the “China threat theory”.   
 
Beijing was thus interpreted as an ascending power, one that intended to challenge US hegemony.
104
  
In reality, it was anything but, and its leadership in fact suffers from numerous political insecurities.  
As the next section will show, China‟s phenomenal growth, while benefiting a large portion of 
society, has nevertheless given rise to various socioeconomic deficiencies. These shortcomings, such 
as rising income inequality and corruption, have generated apprehension amongst Chinese leaders 
over the security of their political position.  The Party‟s anxiety over the success of its 
macroeconomic reforms, therefore, stems from its perceived need to bolster its political foundations in 
the long run, preserving thereby its place as the nation‟s ruling power.  This ultimate goal thus 
explains the recent inflexibility of China‟s leaders over the RMB, and accounts for the aggressive 
defence of its currency policies.   
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The Party‟s Over? Political Stability in Beijing  
 
From environmental protests to labour unrests, reports of social disturbances have risen in recent 
years across China.
105
  Appearing in both rural and urban districts, their occurrences can be tied to 
mounting grievances associated with the country‟s unbridled economic expansion.  In 2010, China‟s 
GDP per capita stood at $US 3680, while it scored 0.415 on the Gini coefficient index.
106
  This 
uneven distribution of wealth has caused tensions to rise between local officials and disaffected 
groups, heightening the anxieties of Party leaders.  Released at the end of 2010, China‟s first ever 
anti-corruption white paper was designed to demonstrate to the public the Party‟s efforts at fighting 
corruption.  Similarly, minimum wages were raised throughout the country in an effort to tame 
escalating work place disruptions.
107
  Impressions of China‟s impressive economic growth have thus 
obscured the shortcomings resulting from development.  It has led to a divergence between the US‟s 
perceptions of China, and the growing apprehensions of the Party.  The US‟s failure to appreciate the 
imperatives of China‟s leaders intensified frictions over the RMB in 2010.  It contributed ultimately to 
the decline in bilateral relations, and formed the basis of Washington‟s “assertive China” theories.108 
 
Numerous high profile labour disputes occurred in China during 2010, including a string of worker 
suicides at a Shenzhen factory.
109
  Underpaid and dissatisfied with poor working conditions, 
employees, such as those from the Foxconn facility, have long been resorting to drastic measures in 
protest of their treatment.  Accounts of these disturbances, though, have been increasing in frequency 
each year, and they have involved ever growing numbers of participants.  Writing in 2006, China 
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watcher Gordon Chang noted how protesters were beginning to number in the tens of thousands, 
escalating the level of violence against state authorities.
110
  Official efforts to encourage enterprises to 
raise wages, moreover, have not kept up with workers‟ expectations, aggravating the situation for 
Party leaders.  In 2010, in the midst of soaring housing prices and consumer inflation, numerous 
walkouts occurred at several major factories.  A strike in a Honda plant in May was quickly followed 
by similar protests across the country, including demonstrations by laid-off workers from China‟s 
banking industry.
111
  Well organised and determined, these incidences were coordinated using new 
media technologies, making their suppression all the more difficult for the regime. 
 
The past two years have also seen a rise in environmental activism, caused by China‟s rampant pursuit 
of economic development.  Surpassing the US in 2010 as the world‟s leading energy consumer, the 
year also witnessed two cases of major oil spills.
112
  Coming on the back of incidences of lead 
poisoning in 2009, these disasters served only to highlight the consequences of unbridled 
production.
113
  Popular attention, moreover, became trained on the corrupt actions of authorities, 
especially after they were found to have contributed to the incidents through their illegal activities.
114
   
Even natural calamities became tied to economic growth, as in the cases of the Yushu earthquake and 
Zhouqu landslide.  Both incidences were attributed to environmental degradation caused by the 
negligence of local authorities; charges which prompted the government to enhance surveillance of its 
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developmental activities.
115
  Public outcry also emerged following several food-related health scares 
through the course of the year, particularly the resurgence of melamine-laced products that had 
escaped recalls in 2008.
116
  Corrupt, profit-seeking officials were blamed for the occurrence of these 
dangerous incidents, negatively affecting public faith in the Party.  In an effort to restore confidence 
in the government, state authorities released an anti-corruption white paper in December, detailing the 
achievements of the CCP in its fight against official corruption.         
 
Entitled, China‟s Efforts to Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Environment, the Party‟s white 
paper claimed victory over more than 240,000 cases of bribery, embezzlement, and rights 
infringement since 2003.
117
  It declared the successful prosecution of a large number of these cases, 
including some that involved high level cadres, and confirmed the indictment of a further 114,000 
people in 2010 alone.
118
  Yet, while these achievements were promoted as a cause for celebration, the 
CCP remained sombre about the prospects of bringing corruption to heel in the near future.  The 
report affirmed that the task remained „complicated and ardours‟, and that more reforms were needed 
to fully purge the system of corrupt practices.
119
  This, acknowledged the Party, remained a top 
priority for the government, and it vowed to step up anti-corruption efforts in a bid to rein in social 
unrest.    
 
It is obvious, therefore, that the CCP views China from a very different perspective than the “assertive 
China” theorists in the US.  Its outlook of China‟s development has been far more sober, and it finds 
itself constantly on the lookout for factors that could jeopardise its grip on political power.  This sense 
of insecurity was particularly acute in 2010, especially with the occurrence of numerous high profile 
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incidences leading up to that year.  In a bid to bolster its political authority, the Party introduced 
several measures that aimed at curtailing rising tensions within society.  Nevertheless, while the Party 
succeeded in „muddling through‟ these crises, its anxieties remained.120  Its attention, therefore, turned 
increasingly inward in an effort to ensure its political survivability.  In March, 2011, the CCP released 
its Twelfth Five Year Plan, a proposal that has been described by some as „the boldest strategic 
document in Chinese history‟.121  Detailing the efforts of the Party to develop a consumption-driven 
economy, the Plan outlined a strategy for dealing with escalating social inequities.  By expanding the 
services industry, and through the enlargement of the social safety net, the Party aimed at 
redistributing the fruits of growth more evenly.
122
  Even corruption was expected to decline in the 
light of per-capita income increase, aiding in the preservation of the Party‟s legitimacy.123  The 
implementation of the Plan, therefore, became the top priority of the CCP, and Chinese leaders 
constantly stressed the importance of stability to its realisation.
124
  Consumption, as Premier Wen 
argued, would be impossible if exports were to collapse and millions of jobs were lost.
125
  Viewed 
from this perspective, the Party‟s fierce resistance to currency revaluation was thus not a sign of its 
assertiveness, but a reaction to external interferences that threatened to jeopardise its very own hold 
on power. 
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Conclusion: Mistaken Identity 
 
US pressure over the RMB affected the Chinese leadership deeply, intensifying just as Beijing was 
commencing a major restructuring of its economy.  As the CCP‟s political survivability depended 
upon the success of these reforms, Chinese leaders became particularly resistant to Washington‟s 
demands.  Viewing RMB revaluation as a potentially volatile issue, officials were loath to suggestions 
that could have derailed their economic plans.  Instead, they insisted that the issue remain 
depoliticised – a proposal that was met with strong criticism in the US.126  Driven by their own 
domestic imperatives, US officials continued to denounce China‟s intransigence all through 2010, 
identifying it as confirmation of China‟s growing assertiveness.  As this chapter has shown, however, 
such perceptions misrepresented China, and symbolised a failure to comprehend China‟s domestic 
reality.  In the end, it was this failure that ultimately contributed to the decline in the bilateral 
relationship.     
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Chapter Two 
 
 
China and the Korean Crisis: „Wilful Blindness‟ or Strategic Anxieties? 
 
 
The alleged Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea‟s (DPRK) sinking of the ROKS Cheonan on 26 
March, 2010, marked the beginning of a critical episode in inter-Korean relations.  The US and the 
Republic of Korea (ROK), acting on the findings of an international investigation (JIG report), hosted 
a series of joint-military exercises off the Korean Peninsula with the aim of deterring Pyongyang from 
future aggression.
127
  At the same time, the Obama administration began pressuring Beijing to rein in 
its unruly neighbour, identifying the DPRK‟s reliance on Chinese aid as the vital leverage required to 
constrain rising tensions.
128
  China‟s leaders, however, adopted a conciliatory approach towards 
Pyongyang, increasing both the level of economic activity and official exchanges between the two 
countries.  Viewing the US‟s confrontational stance as detrimental to regional stability, the Chinese 
proffered instead to resume the stalled Six-Party Talks as a means to diffuse the situation.
129
  Fearing 
further outbursts from the North, Beijing also refused to accept the findings of the JIG report, and 
shielded its ally from any meaningful UN castigation.  China‟s position shifted little throughout the 
year, even after the DPRK‟s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, prompting the US to heighten its pressure 
on the Chinese leadership.  This included the deployment of an aircraft carrier battle group into the 
Yellow Sea in November, a move which drew intense criticism from Beijing, and increased the threat 
perceptions of the Chinese military.   
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China‟s intransigence clearly frustrated US attempts to censure the DPRK, leading President Obama 
to accuse Beijing of „wilful blindness‟.130  Chinese leaders, on the other hand, perceived US pressure 
as „unreasonable and irrational‟, believing that chastisement would only worsen an already tense 
situation.
131
  Already of the view that the US was executing a “containment” policy in Asia, Chinese 
leaders were hesitant to isolate further their only ally in the region.  Although errant at times, the 
DPRK remains nonetheless an important buffer between China and US troops in the ROK, and its loss 
would bring eastern China under US “encirclement”.132  This geostrategic concern, as will be shown 
in this chapter, informed Beijing‟s conciliatory position, and hence precluded its involvement in the 
US-led effort to denounce the Kim Jong-Il regime.  Furthermore, the subsequent „muscle flexing‟ of 
the US military, including its engagement with ASEAN in the South China Sea, served only to 
intensify Chinese strategic anxieties.
133
  These moves, in the eyes of China‟s leaders, confirmed the 
implementation of Washington‟s “containment” policy, and hardened Beijing‟s resolve to secure the 
DPRK‟s stability.  China‟s support for the belligerent state, in turn, reinforced the US‟s “China threat” 
theories, creating an atmosphere of mutual suspicion that strained ties between the two countries.   
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Rocking the Boat: US Pressure on China over DPRK Provocations (2010-2011) 
 
The sinking of the Cheonan resulted in the loss of 46 ROK lives, and came on the back of an already 
tense year marked by DPRK provocations.  Pyongyang‟s nuclear test and attempted long-range rocket 
launch had led to a worsening of ties with the ROK in 2009, setting the stage for further 
confrontations between the two Koreas.
134
  The unprecedented attack on the Cheonan, however, 
threatened to escalate tensions to a boiling point, prompting the US to increase pressure on China to 
rein in its errant neighbour. Beginning in May, following the release of the JIG report, the US 
administration employed various diplomatic means to shore up its relationship with East Asia, 
concentrating on its regional allies, the ROK and Japan.  At the same time, it hyped up its rhetoric 
with Chinese leaders, pressing them to partake in the international campaign to censure the Kim Jong-
Il regime.
135
  A series of US-ROK joint-military exercises was also conducted near Chinese waters, 
symbolising the US‟s growing commitment to the region‟s security.136  These measures were meant, 
first and foremost, to discourage Pyongyang from future aggression, demonstrating the US‟s 
unwavering pursuit of regional stability.
137
  However, they were also intended to remind Beijing of 
the US‟s expanding role in East Asia, especially in the absence of clear Chinese security guarantees.  
This, as one White House official calculated, would „negatively affect China‟s perceived interests‟ in 
the region, prompting Beijing to accede to US entreaties.
138
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Describing the DPRK‟s attack as a „challenge to international peace and security‟, the White House 
commenced a diplomatic campaign designed to consolidate foreign pressure against the Kim 
regime.
139
  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton embarked on a tour of Asia in May, 2010, where she 
reaffirmed the US‟s support for its allies, Japan and the ROK.  Making use of the heightened security 
anxieties in the region, Clinton was able to secure Tokyo‟s agreement to retain US military forces in 
Okinawa – an issue that had long served as a sticking point in the US-Japan security alliance.140  
Similarly, Seoul agreed to extend the US‟s operational control over ROK forces up to 2015, ensuring 
a leading role for the US in the ongoing Korean crisis.
141
  In both instances, Clinton was met with 
expressions of appreciation over the presence of US forces in the region.  Japanese Foreign Minister 
Katsuya Okada, for instance, described Washington‟s military commitments to Japan as 
„indispensable for the security‟ of the country, a view that was seconded by the Defence Minister, 
Toshimi Kitazawa, soon after the Yeonpyeong shelling.
142
  Public sentiment over China had also 
turned sour in the ROK following the sinking, with 73 percent of South Koreans expressing their 
misgivings with Beijing.
143
  China‟s support for the DPRK, ostensible particularly in its hospitality 
towards the visiting Kim, drove both Tokyo and Seoul to seek reassurances with the US military.  
This then allowed Clinton to fulfil her goal of assembling a united, multilateral front in an attempt to 
overturn Chinese obstinacy.
144
  With this broad support, Clinton was able to call for Beijing‟s 
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contribution towards a response to the sinking, a contribution commensurate to China‟s growing stake 
in the preservation of regional security.
145
     
 
It was with this collective message that Clinton visited Beijing on 23 May, meeting with Chinese 
State Councillor Dai Bingguo for the second S&ED gathering.  There, she presented the findings of 
the JIG report to her Chinese counterparts, pressuring them to accept the DPRK‟s culpability in the 
sinking.
146
  The international investigation, Clinton argued, „was objective, the evidence 
overwhelming, [and] the conclusion inescapable‟; China, therefore, had „a responsibility and a duty‟ 
to the international community in seeing Pyongyang punished for its provocations.
147
  President 
Obama, speaking at the G-20 Summit in Toronto a month later, reiterated this stance when he called 
on Beijing to cease its „wilful blindness‟ and face reality.148  Pyongyang, he stressed, „should not be 
indulged for acts of aggression‟ – a statement that clearly identified China‟s conciliatory approach as 
a source for regional instability.
149
  Obama also expressed his confidence and support for the ROK‟s 
moves in the UN, placing pressure on China to accede to UNSC reproach over the DPRK.
150
  He 
urged Chinese leaders to „take a much tougher line‟ with the North, aiming his remarks specifically at 
Chinese President Hu Jintao.
151
  These strong, public statements focused the international spotlight on 
Beijing, and placed the onus of restraining Pyongyang squarely at China‟s feet.  The inflexibility of 
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the Chinese leadership, however, served only to draw more criticism on Beijing, heightening the 
impression of China‟s callous disregard for its regional responsibilities.152 
 
In light of Beijing‟s persisting inaction following November‟s Yeonpyeong shelling, US pressure on 
China increased dramatically.  A firmer posture was adopted by the US and its allies in Asia, with 
Washington serving as host to a first-ever trilateral defence summit involving Japan and the ROK.  
The three countries pledged to strengthen their collaboration over security in the region, and presented 
a joint appeal to China urging for increased cooperation on the Peninsula.
153
  The US, declared 
Secretary Clinton, expected the Chinese to „send a clear, unmistakable message‟ to the DPRK 
condemning its provocations; anything less, she argued, was tantamount to inaction.
154
  Obama further 
emphasised this position to President Hu in a phone conversation in December, warning the Chinese 
leader that Beijing was falling far short of its international obligations.
155
  This time, however, the 
White House was determined to add substance to their rhetoric, and Obama subsequently dispatched 
an aircraft carrier battle group into the Yellow Sea.  An inimitable symbol of the US‟s military power, 
the carrier was meant primarily to emphasise Washington‟s commitment to the security of the region.  
Its deployment so close to China‟s heartland, nonetheless, represented an escalation of US pressure on 
Beijing, serving as an indication to China of the consequences of its continued intransigence.  
 
The USS George Washington was deployed as part of exercise “Invincible Spirit”, a series of US-
ROK joint naval drills designed to deter DPRK aggression through a unified show of force.  
Prearranged during a July defence meeting in Seoul between the two countries, the exercise was 
scheduled to take place in several stages through the course of the year, demonstrating the 
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effectiveness and interoperability of the US-ROK alliance.
156
  Although Chinese objections had seen 
the earlier phases of the exercise occur away from the Yellow Sea, by late 2010, Washington had 
become less accommodating.
157
  In order to send a strong message to Beijing, the White House 
instructed that the exercise‟s latter phases be carried out in these sensitive waters, in spite of China‟s 
vociferous protests.
158
  The Chinese, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen 
declared, had „unique influence‟ over Pyongyang; hence, they had to „bear unique responsibility‟ in 
upholding peace in the region.
159
  This view was reinforced by then-Defence Secretary Robert Gates, 
who described the DPRK as a direct threat to the US and its allies.
160
  The joint exercises were thus a 
response to this threat, and they were meant to pressure Beijing just as they were designed to deter the 
Kim regime.  As one White House Official plainly stated, „China clearly did not like to see US 
aircraft carriers in the Yellow Sea‟, an event which Obama promised would reoccur should Beijing 
fail to take firmer action against the DPRK.
161
   
 
As the next section will show, China took great notice of this series of exercises, particularly the 
presence of the George Washington in the Yellow Sea.  “Invincible Spirit”, however, was not the only 
US-ROK joint exercise to occur in 2010, although it was by far the most controversial.  The annual 
“Ulchi Freedom Guardian” drills also greatly alarmed Beijing, especially as it simulated a US-ROK 
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intervention in Pyongyang following the regime‟s hypothetical collapse.162  With thousands of US 
troops and the Pentagon‟s latest military hardware on display, these exercises were clear symbols of 
Washington‟s power projection capabilities.  Furthermore, that these drills were occurring at Beijing‟s 
doorstep, and included participants from the region such as Japan, only underscored further the 
consequences of China‟s persisting intransigence.163  In the absence of palpable security guarantees 
from China, countries in the region were being driven rapidly into the US‟s orbit; an outcome 
facilitated by Washington in the face of Chinese inaction over the Kim regime.
164
  The joint exercises, 
therefore, represented some of the strongest pressure exerted on China by the US in the wake of 
Pyongyang‟s provocations.  Chinese leverage, as US officials argued, was the key to maintaining 
peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.  Beijing‟s apparent failure to apply its influence over its 
ally, therefore, heightened perceptions of its flagrant disregard for regional security.  It generated, in 
the words of a strategic analyst, an “us versus them” mentality, with China seen as being on the side 
of the DPRK.
165
  This outlook, as will be argued, severely distorted the intentions behind China‟s 
conciliatory approach towards Pyongyang, impacting significantly the overall US-China relationship.  
 
 
Beijing‟s Claustrophobia: China‟s Resistance to US Pressure over the DPRK (2010-2011) 
 
China‟s immediate reaction following the sinking of the Cheonan was to call for calm and restraint on 
the Peninsula, a stance that it would resolutely cling to for the rest of the year.
166
  Arguing against the 
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use of coercion as a form of pressure, Chinese leaders urged instead for dialogue as the means to 
resolve the Korean crisis.  Confrontation, as pointed out by the Foreign Ministry, served only to 
heighten Pyongyang‟s threat perceptions, leading inevitably to its adoption of further aggressive 
actions.
167
  As a result, Chinese officials were reluctant to accept the findings of the JIG report, and 
expended considerable effort to mitigate the UNSC response to the sinking.  Beijing subsequently 
announced the DPRK‟s intentions of restarting the stalled Six-Party Talks, and stepped up its 
diplomatic and economic exchanges with the Kim regime.  China also criticised the US for attempting 
to destabilise Pyongyang through its joint military exercises, describing the drills as blatant 
illustrations of „sabre rattling‟.168  To China, the DPRK represented an important strategic buffer 
against US forces in the ROK, and the preservation of Pyongyang‟s stability was thus a paramount 
goal for Beijing.
169
  China‟s security, deemed its leaders, would be compromised should Pyongyang 
become isolated, especially with the rest of the region already leaning towards the US‟s orbit.170  It 
was, hence, this fear of “encirclement” that drove China‟s conciliatory posture with its ally in 2010, 
something which the US ignored or failed to realise.  Instead, it criticised China for taking a lenient 
stand towards Pyongyang, accusing Beijing of enabling the DPRK‟s belligerence.171  Washington‟s 
confrontational approach, however, particularly its „muscle flexing‟ in the Yellow Sea, served only to 
heighten China‟s “containment” perceptions, making it more difficult for both sides to reach a 
compromise over the Korean crisis.   
 
China‟s reticence over the Korean crisis began with its reluctance to implicate Pyongyang over the 
sinking.  Its unwillingness to accept the findings of the JIG report, for instance, was exemplified at the 
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May S&ED meeting, where no mention was made of the investigation in Dai Bingguo‟s official 
remarks.
172
  Major General Zhu Chenghu, director-general of Beijing‟s National Defence University, 
was even less tacit when he described the report as „controversial‟ during the annual IISS Asia 
Security Summit (Shangri-la Dialogue), a remark made directly to then-Defence Secretary Robert 
Gates.
173
  Similarly, Premier Wen Jiabao, speaking at a trilateral meeting in Jeju, ROK, made only 
fleeting references to the report, emphasising instead the need to promote stability between regional 
parties.
174
  Economic development, the Premier counselled, would be jeopardised should the crisis 
escalate beyond control, ruining „the hard-won achievements‟ of the wider East Asian community.175  
Mollifying tensions, therefore, represented the crux behind Beijing‟s conciliatory strategy, and this 
meant suppressing any mention of Pyongyang‟s alleged role behind the sinking.  Consequently, US-
ROK attempts to obtain a strong UN response to the incident were blocked by Beijing, producing only 
a tepid Presidential statement that neither implicated nor condemned the DPRK directly.
176
  While this 
result clearly satisfied the Kim regime, which had repeatedly insisted on its innocence in the affair, it 
subjected Beijing to further pressure from the US.
177
  Even while the latter‟s warships began their 
joint drills off the ROK‟s coast, however, Chinese leaders continued to insist on dialogue as the best 
means of preserving regional stability.    
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Beijing had begun pushing for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks as early as May, when it served 
as host to Kim Jong-Il during an informal visit.  During this trip, Kim announced the reversal of his 
2009 decision to withdraw from the talks, creating the possibility for a recommencement of 
discussions.
178
  Designed primarily as a platform for achieving the denuclearisation of the Peninsula, 
the talks were nevertheless proffered by Beijing as a way to ease tensions over the Cheonan‟s sinking.  
Engagement, asserted China‟s Foreign Ministry, was more conducive to the preservation of stability 
than confrontation, and it thus beseeched Washington and Seoul to help revive negotiations.
179
  This 
appeal took on greater urgency in the wake of the Yeonpyeong shelling, with Beijing calling for an 
emergency meeting of delegates from the six parties.
180
  China‟s offer, however, was turned down by 
the US and ROK in a joint statement in December, in which they both expressed their common 
misgivings with Pyongyang‟s credibility.181  Past rounds had shown that the DPRK held a tendency to 
renege on its obligations.
182
  Secretary Clinton, therefore, declared that the US‟s position would 
remain unchanged, unless Pyongyang took „concrete steps‟ to demonstrate its commitment to the 
talks.
183
 
 
These „concrete steps‟ included a demand for Pyongyang to apologise for its role in the Cheonan‟s 
sinking, something the DPRK refused to do.
184
  As a consequence, the US-ROK joint military 
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exercises persisted throughout the year, drawing strong protests from the Chinese.  Not only were the 
manoeuvres viewed as excessively provocative by Beijing, they were also regarded as counter-
productive to the stability of the Peninsula.
185
  Exercises, such as “Ulchi Freedom Guardian”, for 
instance, simulated the collapse of the Kim regime and rehearsed US intervention strategies for such 
an event.  Moreover, they involved thousands of US personnel and dozens of warships, amounting, in 
the eyes of the Chinese, to flagrant displays of Washington‟s military power.186  At a period where 
tensions were already stretched to a breaking point, these exercises served only to heighten 
Pyongyang‟s apprehensions.187  They fuelled its resolve to retain its belligerent behaviour and 
complicated the climate for Sino-DPRK discussions.  Pyongyang, Chinese analysts argued, would 
never heed China‟s counsel as long as Washington persisted with its confrontational policies.188  
Decision makers in China were thus highly critical of the manoeuvres, perceiving them as unhelpful 
and potentially destabilising to the Kim regime.     
 
Concerned about the adverse effects Pyongyang‟s collapse would have on Beijing, Chinese leaders 
consequently stepped-up their engagement with the North, promising fresh aid and economic 
agreements.  They were well aware of the political challenges plaguing Pyongyang amidst the crisis, 
and were therefore reluctant to exert their full leverage on the vulnerable regime.  Kim‟s failed 
economic reforms, for instance, had already exacerbated the DPRK‟s food shortages, while his 
imminent succession placed even further strains on the country‟s stability.189  Should the regime fall, 
Chinese policy makers warned, millions of refugees could flow across the border into China, 
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potentially involving Beijing in a humanitarian crisis.
190
  Furthermore, it would also upset the stability 
of the region, jeopardising the development of the Chinese economy.  For these reasons, Chinese 
leaders viewed US pressure on Beijing as „unreasonable and irrational‟, and questioned the authority 
of „a country that lay 8,000 kilometres‟ overseas.191  They rebuked Washington for escalating tensions 
through its drills, and chose instead to advance diplomatic interaction with the Kims.  Chinese 
officials hosted the visiting leader twice in 2010, first in May then in August, taking him on tours of 
China‟s north-eastern industrial cities.192  Kim was even pictured embracing President Hu on one of 
his trips, signifying the deepening relationship between the two countries.
193
  Economic figures, 
moreover, revealed that China-DPRK trade had reached record highs through the course of the year, 
led by surging Chinese investments in the North‟s mineral industries.194  All this, however, only added 
to the impression of China‟s increasing intransigence, attracting further US pressure and criticism on 
Beijing.  
 
The George Washington‟s deployment in the Yellow Sea was officially touted as a move to deter 
further DPRK aggression.  Chinese analysts, however, were unconvinced, interpreting it as part of a 
US “containment” strategy.195  To Beijing, the warship clearly symbolised Washington‟s intent to 
influence its position on the DPRK, sparking officials to associate its deployment with colonialist 
“gunboat diplomacy”.196  The vessel, moreover, was identified by the PLA as a threat to China‟s 
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national security, evoking memories of the controversial Taiwan Straits Crisis of the 1990s.
197
  The 
White House, on that occasion, had dispatched two aircraft carriers into similar waters in a gesture of 
US-Taiwan friendship, forcing China to retreat from its confrontation with the smaller state. Since 
then, the event has been remembered with great dissatisfaction, making the latest deployment of the 
George Washington all the more contentious.  92 percent of Chinese, for instance, were found to 
construe the warship‟s presence with some enmity, while a Kissinger Institute survey identified the 
US as the biggest threat in the eyes of China‟s citizenry.198  The vessel‟s proximity to Beijing, in 
particular, raised the level of trepidation in the capital, prompting China‟s state media to label the 
deployment as a blatant act of hostility.
199
  The US‟s actions, therefore, had raised the level of mutual 
suspicion between the two countries, heightening Beijing‟s strategic threat perceptions.  With the 
strengthening of US alliances throughout the region, Chinese leaders found themselves increasingly 
“contained” within a web of US-friendly nations and military bases.  As a consequence, the DPRK‟s 
role as a buffer took on greater importance, fuelling Beijing‟s resolve to stand by its conciliatory 
policies.  This, however, served only to intensify the dispute between the US and China, contributing 
ultimately to the deterioration in bilateral relations.         
 
This section has thus shown that the US‟s strengthening of its Japan-ROK alliances, along with its 
provocative „muscle flexing‟ in the Yellow Sea, contributed greatly to Beijing‟s “containment” 
anxieties.  These developments alone, however, do not paint an adequate picture explaining China‟s 
position in the Peninsula.  In order to fully understand Beijing‟s geostrategic mindset, it would be 
necessary to examine the wider events that surrounded the Korean crisis, particularly the re-expansion 
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of Washington‟s presence in 2010 throughout the Asia-Pacific.  These developments, like the events 
surrounding the Peninsula, contributed ultimately to Beijing‟s “containment” perceptions, leading 
inevitably to the worsening of US-China relations.  The next section aims, therefore, to shed some 
light on these crucial issues, providing, in the process, a greater understanding of China‟s growing 
fears of strategic “encirclement”.   
 
 
“Full Spectrum Dominance”: Beijing‟s Perception of US Engagement with Asia  
As mentioned, the Korean crisis provided the US with an opportunity to strengthen its alliances and 
military presence in East Asia, intensifying in the process China‟s strategic threat perceptions.  The 
occurrence of further developments throughout the Asia-Pacific in 2010, however, also added to 
Beijing‟s “containment” mindset, contributing ultimately to China‟s dogged position on the Peninsula.  
Washington‟s arms sale to Taiwan, for instance, was regarded as a violation of China‟s “core national 
interests”, prompting Chinese leaders to suspend military-to-military ties with the US.200  Similarly, 
the White House‟s engagement with ASEAN in the South China Sea (SCS) generated immense 
vexation in Beijing, which perceived the move as an unwarranted complication of its regional 
relations.
201
  The subsequent expansion of US military bases across Asia, and Obama‟s growing 
attention to ballistic missile defence (BMD), likewise intensified China‟s “encirclement” anxieties.  
They created the impression that Washington was hedging against a rising China, one which it viewed 
as a forthcoming enemy.
202
  Officials in Beijing, therefore, grew increasingly apprehensive in light of 
these developments, fuelling their cautious approach towards the Korean crisis.  The ensuing pressure 
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from Washington, however, only worsened the already tense context, trapping the two countries in a 
cycle of mutual distrust and strategic rivalry.    
 
Chinese suspicions were first roused in January, 2010, following President Obama‟s sale of a US$6.4 
billion arms package to Taiwan, in spite of strong protests from Beijing.
203
  Included in the package, 
moreover, were 200 Patriot PAC-3 missiles, capable of mitigating the threat posed to Taipei from 
China‟s missile batteries.204  This immediately led to a proliferation of hostile rhetoric in Beijing, 
which interpreted the deal as a violation of China‟s “core national interests”.205  Chinese officials, 
viewing the island as part of China‟s sovereign territory, regarded the sales as disrespectful intrusions 
into the country‟s internal affairs.  They expressed their displeasure with Washington‟s previous 
agreements with Taipei, and identified them as impediments to US-China relations.
206
  Obama‟s latest 
agreement, therefore, appeared to be a slap in the face of Beijing, prompting fierce reactions from the 
PLA.  Major-General Yang Yi of the National Defence University, for instance, described the US as 
China‟s largest security threat, echoing the views of China‟s state media.207  At the same time, 
General Ma Xiaotian, China‟s Deputy Chief of General Staff, criticised Washington for breaching the 
One-China policy, blaming it for the suspension of US-China military relations.
208
  Others within 
China‟s defence community were equally boisterous in the wake of the arms sale, with many, such as 
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academic Han Xudong, considering it a part of the US‟s hegemonic strategy.209  The arms sale to 
Taiwan, therefore, generated animosity amongst China‟s top military ranks, and led many to perceive 
Washington as a threat to China‟s security.  More importantly, it marked an episode that contributed 
to the growth of mistrust between the two countries, heightening in the process Beijing‟s 
“containment” anxieties. 
 
The controversial arms sale, however, was quickly followed by the US‟s declaration of its renewed 
interests in the SCS, raising even further apprehension in Beijing.  The resource-rich region had 
already witnessed a proliferation of territorial disputes in recent times, making it a highly contentious 
subject of diplomacy.
210
  Chinese frustrations were thus ignited when Washington announced its 
intention to mediate over the disputes, sparking outcries of a perceived US “containment” strategy.211  
This was especially so when Secretary Clinton reaffirmed its military support for Japan, promising to 
aid Tokyo in the defence of its disputed territories.
212
  Even though China maintained its own claims 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, these were essentially abrogated when Washington declared the 
islands covered under the US-Japan security treaty.
213
  It seemed to Beijing, therefore, that the 
                                                          
209
 Global Times, Arms Sales Help US Extend its Sphere of Influence (28 Dec 2010), http:// 
www.globaltimes.cn/opinion/commentary/2010-12/604721_2.html, viewed 24 May, 2011; Jenny Clegg, 
China‟s Global Strategy: Towards a Multipolar World (New York: Pluto Press, 2009), pp. 18-38: Han Xudong 
is not alone, nor does he represent a purely nationalistic view.  Jenny Clegg, writing for the University of 
Lancashire, has also argued that the US has sought to “contain” China in the Asia-Pacific, enhancing its military 
resources and ties in the region to safeguard its global hegemony. 
 
210
 Robert Beckman, „South China Sea: Worsening Dispute or Growing Clarity in Claims?‟, RSIS Commentaries 
(Aug 2010), pp. 1-3; Michael S. Chase, „Chinese Suspicion and US Intentions‟, Survival, 53, no. 3 (May 2011), 
pp. 140-42; Michael Mazza, „Chess on the High Seas: Dangerous times for US-China Relations‟, American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, no. 3 (Aug 2010), pp. 1-8; John Hemmings, „The Potential for 
Sino-US Discord in the South China Sea‟, The RUSI Journal, 156, no. 2 (Apr/May 2011), pp. 90-95: The South 
China Sea disputes have been around for some time and involve countries like Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and China, all of whom have overlapping claims with each other.  While these disputes have been 
handled fairly amicably in the past, the passing of a recent UN dateline in 2009 for the registration of 
continental shelf claims led to a proliferation of confrontations in the region.   
 
211
 The New York Times, Offering to Aid Talks, Us Challenges China on Disputed Islands (23 Jul 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html, viewed 15 May, 2011.  
 
212
 Quoted in Chase, „Chinese Suspicion and US Intentions‟, p. 142. 
 
213
 Ibid., pp. 141-43. 
48 
 
recently intensified engagement of the US was intended to curtail Chinese interest in the SCS.
214
  This 
view was reinforced when Admiral Robert Willard, commander of the US Pacific Command, 
identified Beijing‟s naval spending as a source of regional instability.  Echoing the remarks of defence 
Secretary Robert Gates, Willard named China as the driving force behind Washington‟s heightened 
engagement with ASEAN countries.
215
  The strategic interests of the US, he argued, depended on 
Washington‟s stepped-up presence in the SCS, especially in light of China‟s rapidly expanding 
military capabilities.
216
  It was comments and actions such as these, however, that fuelled Beijing‟s 
growing suspicions, engendering an outlook of US-China rivalry.
217
 
 
Washington‟s engagement with the region, argued Chinese officials, was aimed at “containing” the 
rise of Beijing, exploiting in the process China‟s disputes in the SCS.218  Similarly, by drawing 
attention to China‟s military spending, the US escalated tensions within the region, thereby weakening 
Beijing‟s ties with its neighbours.219  The result, as they pointed out, was the increasingly apparent 
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realignment of the Asia-Pacific into a pro-US, anti-China bloc – what PLA academic Li Jie described 
as an Asian equivalent of NATO.
220
  Beginning with Vietnam, the US rapidly expanded its military 
cooperation with countries throughout the region, facilitated by high-level diplomatic and military 
dialogues.
221
  Secretary Clinton, for instance, spent twelve days travelling through Asia in November, 
meeting with her counterparts in Malaysia, Vietnam and Australia.
222
  Likewise, President Obama 
made a tour of India and Indonesia in the same month, concluding security agreements with both 
democracies.
223
  The former, in particular, has been described as a strategic partner by the US, with 
Obama expressing his support for its place on the UNSC.
224
  He also concluded a US$12 billion dollar 
arms deal with New Delhi, making it the largest defence transaction in their cooperative history.
225
  
Diplomatic missions such as these therefore facilitated in the expansion of US military relations 
throughout the Asia-Pacific, particularly with countries along Beijing‟s periphery.  Together with its 
bases in Central Asia, these peripheral countries completed, what PLA Colonel Dai Xu called, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
report to Congress, the Department of Defence identified China‟s increasing military budget as a cause for 
concern, one which would require the US to counter through developments of its own. 
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„crescent-shaped ring of encirclement‟ around China.226  This intensified immensely Beijing‟s 
“containment anxieties”, and affected its strategic perception of its surrounding regions.  
Consequently, it became wary of taking any tough actions on the Korean Peninsula, and strove instead 
to „promote China-DPRK relations to a new and higher level‟.227 
 
As a result of these developments, the year 2010 witnessed a proliferation of Washington‟s military 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region.  Arms sales were concluded with countries, such as India, Taiwan 
and the Philippines, and joint exercises were carried out with a host of other countries across Asia.  
The Pentagon, however, sought to achieve “full spectrum dominance” in the Asia-Pacific, and 
consequently increased its focus on its BMD plans in the region.
228
  This involved distributing missile 
interceptors in a number of US-friendly nations, and conducting nuclear simulations in collaboration 
with its space-based assets.  Both Japan and the ROK, for instance, were earmarked for joint BMD 
development, with the US providing assistance in the enhancement of their own indigenous 
programmes.
229
  In the meantime, Washington proceeded to extend its BMD coverage over the East 
Asia region through the deployment of its successfully tested Theatre Missile Defence programme.
230
  
This was a sophisticated BMD system based off Aegis warships and land-based Patriot PAC-3 
launchers, all of which were distributed to Taiwan, the ROK, and Japan.
231
  In addition to these 
deployments, however, the US Space Command also conducted computer simulations of a US nuclear 
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attack on China, ostensibly in the aim of testing its regional BMD capabilities.
232
  This naturally 
caused some apprehension in Beijing, prompting the Chinese to develop their own BMD 
programme.
233
  Hence, although Washington maintained that its BMD systems remained directed at 
the potential nuclear threat from Pyongyang, many in China remain unconvinced.
234
  Instead, the 
recent expansion of the programme, and its deployment along China‟s borders, served only to 
heighten Beijing‟s “containment” anxieties in the region and further complicated its geostrategic 
mindset. 
 
 
Conclusion: A Sinking Feeling 
Beijing‟s support for UN sanctions on the DPRK had been forthcoming during Pyongyang‟s nuclear 
violations in 2006 and 2009.
235
  Furthermore, the freezing of Pyongyang‟s financial assets in Macao 
in 2005, and the shutdown of the oil pipeline between China and the DPRK in 2003, illustrate that 
Beijing has acted in an internationally cooperative fashion in the past in reaction to Pyongyang‟s 
provocations.
236
  The Cheonan incident in 2010, therefore, marked a perceptible turnaround in its 
approach with the DPRK, demonstrating China‟s latest resolve to avoid aggravating the Kim regime.   
 
As this chapter has shown, the dramatic shift in Beijing‟s DPRK strategy stemmed largely from its 
rising geostrategic anxieties in the region.  In light of Washington‟s expanding military engagement in 
the Asia-Pacific, Beijing began to grow increasingly wary of a US “containment” strategy around 
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China.  Not only had Washington positioned its military assets perilously along China‟s periphery, it 
had also strengthened its alliances with the ROK and Japan.  At the same time, the US persisted with 
arms sales to Taiwan in spite of Beijing‟s protests, and asserted its authority over territorial disputes in 
the SCS.  Officials in China were thus reluctant to adopt strong measures against Pyongyang in the 
wake of its provocations, fearing that it might cause the regime to collapse.  They also did not want to 
isolate China‟s only ally in the region, which, although errant at times, was nonetheless an important 
buffer between Beijing and US troops in the ROK.  China‟s conciliatory stance was shaped, therefore, 
by this crucial geostrategic imperative, and Washington‟s pressure, particularly its „muscle flexing in 
the Yellow Sea, served only to harden Beijing‟s stance on the Peninsula.  In the end, it was this sense 
of mutual suspicion that fuelled the confrontational atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula, contributing 
ultimately to the decline in ties between China and the US. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
A Noble Struggle: Politics at the Expense of Human Rights? 
 
 
The awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to jailed Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo generated great 
uproar in Beijing.  It was regarded not only as an affront to China‟s judicial system and national 
sovereignty, but also, more importantly, as an attack on the CCP‟s political authority itself.237  Liu had 
been convicted for his role in the drafting of Charter 08, a grassroots manifesto calling for an end to 
the CCP‟s political monopoly.238  Washington‟s support for the award, therefore, together with its 
demands for Liu‟s release, appeared as a blatant challenge to the Party‟s leadership and political 
legitimacy.  The issue of human rights had already been used against Beijing during the country‟s 
standoff with the Internet giant, Google, earlier in the year.
239
  Now, it seemed that the White House 
was attempting to renew its pressure on the Party, utilising Liu‟s struggle for freedom as a means to 
orchestrate political reform in China.  Consequently, the CCP went on the offensive, intensifying its 
efforts to police dissident activity throughout the country.  At the same time, it stepped up its 
regulation of the Internet, expunging the Web of sensitive information surrounding Liu‟s Nobel 
accolade.   
 
These draconian measures, however, attracted further criticism from Washington, which in turn 
served only to inflate Beijing‟s siege mentality.  The Party, perceiving itself to be a victim of a US-led 
plot to destabilise the country, tightened its control over politically subversive individuals and rights 
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activists.  This trend intensified in the wake of the Arab Spring, especially after online appeals 
threatened to broaden the revolutionary movement into China.
240
  While the “Jasmine Revolution” 
ultimately failed to materialise, the stringent precautionary measures adopted by the state to suppress 
its occurrence, nevertheless, testified to the political anxieties of the CCP.
241
  US pressure, as this 
chapter will show, was thus instrumental in provoking unease in Beijing, fuelling conspiracy notions 
that heightened the threat perceptions of the Party.  From the issue of Internet censorship to the 
imprisonment of Liu, Washington continued to censure China‟s human rights record throughout 2010.  
The US expressed support for political dissidents in the country, and pushed for change in the 
politically repressive regime.
242
  These moves, however, only deepened Beijing‟s suspicions even 
further, ensuring the persistence of its latest cycle of repression well into 2011. 
 
 
Awarding Dissension: US Pressure on China‟s Human Rights Record (2010-2011) 
 
Liu Xiaobo was sentenced to 11 years in prison in December 2009 for his role in the drafting of 
Charter 08, a revolutionary document which was treated as politically subversive by the CCP.
243
  The 
manifesto, modelled after Czechoslovakia‟s anti-Soviet Charter 77 thirty years ago, contained 
provisions which called for the establishment of an electoral democracy in China.
244
  It criticised the 
authoritarian government for its failure to deliver on the issue of human rights, and highlighted the 
rampant corruption and repression which it claimed pervades Chinese society.  Most importantly, it 
identified Party rule as unconstitutional, and demanded reforms that would help realise the rights and 
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freedoms enshrined within the Chinese Constitution.
245
  Described by human rights groups as the 
most important political statement since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests (in which Liu was also 
notably a part of), Charter 08 and its supporters consequently became the focus of a massive 
government crackdown.
246
  Fellow drafters, such as political theorist Zhang Zuhua, were detained and 
interrogated by police, while Liu was subsequently arrested and charged with subversion.
247
  His 
history with dissent had apparently earned him the wrath of the state, which, as fellow activist Xu 
Youyu asserted, persecuted Liu to discourage any further dissension.
248
  It was nonetheless a result of 
this harsh sentence that Liu subsequently gained his place on the world stage, transforming him into 
„the foremost symbol of the wide-ranging struggle for human rights in China‟.249 
 
On 8 October 2010, the Norwegian Nobel Committee selected Liu as the recipient of the 2010 Nobel 
Peace Prize, awarding him the honour in recognition of his long struggle against the PRC regime.  
The White House immediately expressed its support for the decision, with both President Obama and 
Secretary Clinton releasing statements of commendation to Liu.  Stressing the universality of the 
values which Liu was fighting for, Obama praised the Nobel laureate and appealed for his immediate 
release.
250
  Similarly, Clinton criticised the Chinese government for its failure to respect the rights of 
its citizens, reprimanding the authoritarian regime over its political obstinacy.
251
  Obama, who had 
himself obtained the award the previous year, was particularly poignant when he described Liu‟s 
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sacrifices in his struggle for freedom.  He conveyed his regret over China‟s decision to keep Liu from 
receiving his prize, and identified his imprisonment as a clear and inimitable validation of the Nobel 
Committee‟s decision.252  In a sign of respect, moreover, Obama declared that Liu was more 
deserving of the award than he was, emphasising the significant role which the dissident now 
occupied in the US‟s campaign for human rights.253  The administration‟s message to Beijing was thus 
unmistakable, and its desire for change in China was clearly embodied in its support for Liu.  
Accordingly, the White House continued to raise the issue of Liu‟s incarceration at bilateral meetings 
throughout the year, urging Beijing to release the only Nobel laureate still remaining in prison.   
 
Joining the administration in its condemnation of China, Congress issued a resolution in November 
illustrating its admiration and support for Liu.
254
  The legislative body had become one of the most 
outspoken critics of China‟s human rights record since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, and its 
passing of H.RES. 1717 symbolised a continuation of its activism against Beijing.
255
  Highlighting 
Liu‟s role in the promotion of democratic reform in China, the resolution denounced his current 
persecution by the Chinese government and described him as a political prisoner of conscience.  It 
went on to demand his immediate release, and motioned for the matter to be treated as a major US 
foreign policy objective.
256
  In the months that followed, various members of Congress subsequently 
delivered several letters of appeal to Obama, urging the President to follow through on the issue.  
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, for instance, wrote in 
praise of Charter 08, and insisted that the topic of Liu‟s imprisonment occupy a central part of the 
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agenda during Hu Jintao‟s state visit.257  To drive home the importance of the issue, Ros-Lehtinen 
proceeded to hand a copy of the letter to Hu during his call on Congress, effectively demonstrating the 
intense controversy which the human rights issue generated between the two countries.
258
   
 
In another letter presented to Obama during Hu‟s visit, 32 congressmen berated Beijing‟s „egregious 
human rights record‟, identifying Liu‟s imprisonment as a violation of his fundamental liberties.259  
Led by Frank R. Wolf, co-chairman of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, the congressmen 
proposed a list of demands which they expected Obama to raise with the Chinese leader.  Of highest 
priority on the list was the securement of Liu‟s release, along with numerous other jailed activists and 
human rights lawyers.
260
  In addition, the congressmen listed steps which China had to take in order to 
improve its human rights record, beginning with an extensive reform of its political system.  
Testimony provided by exiled dissidents, such as Yang Jianli, helped influence Congress‟s pressure 
on the Chinese, supplying legislators with first-hand accounts of Beijing‟s human rights violations.261  
Additionally, human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Freedom House, 
furnished officials with up-to-date reports of human rights abuses in China, facilitating Washington‟s 
approach with Beijing.
262
  An appeal by nine human rights groups, for instance, led to a meeting 
between Obama and several Chinese dissidents in the White House, just days prior to Hu‟s visit.263  
According to an administration official, the meeting convinced the President of the gravity of China‟s 
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deteriorating human rights environment, thereby ensuring that the issue remained a top priority during 
Hu‟s trip.264  
 
Indeed, the topic did arise during the Chinese leader‟s visit to Washington in January 2011, where Hu 
was pressed to acknowledge Beijing‟s shortcomings regarding human rights.265  Obama, moreover, 
raised the question of Liu‟s internment on numerous occasions during the summit, stressing to Hu the 
centrality of human rights in US foreign policy.
266
  While most of these sensitive discussions occurred 
behind closed doors, the issue was nevertheless treated publicly by the US media.  Mainstream 
newspapers like the New York Times, for instance, began documenting recent human rights abuses in 
China, identifying various dissidents detained by Beijing in the run up to Hu‟s visit.267  Controversial 
statements by US officials also helped to keep the question of human rights in the public eye, adding 
to the pressure on the Chinese.  Senator Harry Reid‟s on-air depiction of Hu Jintao as a dictator, for 
example, may have been overstated (he later recanted his reference), but it served nevertheless to 
attract attention to the undemocratic nature of China‟s regime.268  Negative coverage such as these 
underscored the dichotomy in the levels of freedoms between the two countries, casting Beijing in an 
unflattering light.  They emphasised, furthermore, the US‟s position as a champion of universal 
liberties, “naming and shaming” authoritarian Beijing.  As former US Ambassador to China, John 
Huntsman, declared in his speech when leaving the country, the US had a special role to play „in the 
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fundamental struggle for human dignity‟.269  Part of this struggle, therefore, meant challenging 
China‟s perception of human rights, illuminating violations made by the regime and convincing it to 
change its ways. 
 
This „frank and candid assessment‟ of Beijing‟s human rights record was exemplified in the State 
Department‟s US Human Rights Country Report on China, released in April 2011.270  It highlighted a 
negative trend in the country‟s human rights practices, and identified Liu‟s incarceration as a distinct 
failure of China‟s justice system.  The report also criticised Chinese government policies surrounding 
religious freedom and ethnic minorities, particularly the strong arm tactics used to suppress members 
of its own population.
271
  Furthermore, it shed light on the constraints faced by activists and human 
rights lawyers in the country, many of whom had allegedly experienced some form of harassment by 
the regime.
272
  The purpose of the report, as stated by Clinton, was to focus attention on China‟s 
„deplorable human rights record‟; and to this end, it was highly successful.273  It gained the attention 
of Beijing and elicited vehement objections from the Chinese foreign ministry.  The most important 
role of the report, however, lay in its perceived ability to inspire change in China.  As Assistant 
Secretary of State Michael Posner emphasised, the public nature of the document ensured that it could 
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be used to „help reinforce a human rights agenda‟ in China, supporting movements within the country 
that advocate for reform in Beijing.
274
   
 
The illumination of Beijing‟s human rights violations was thus perceived by Washington as a means 
of bolstering democracy movements within China.  It was designed to provide freedom advocates 
with not only the information needed to pursue legal cases, but also the knowledge that they were not 
alone in their fight against oppression.
275
  In addition, Washington‟s approach was further designed to 
“name and shame” Beijing, vilifying the authoritarian regime in the eyes of its people.  Political 
change, as Posner declared, „occurs from within a society‟; the US, being a champion of human rights 
and liberty, had a duty therefore to help „Chinese citizens determine their own political future‟.276  
Consequently, Liu‟s Nobel award and his incarceration turned him into the White House‟s most 
potent weapon.  His long history as an activist, together with his penchant for non-violence, made him 
an ideal symbol in the struggle against Beijing.
277
  As the next section will show, however, 
Washington‟s celebration of Liu did not sit well with the Party, contributing ultimately to the 
deterioration in the bilateral relationship.  Perceiving itself to be under siege, the CCP proceeded to 
launch a wave of repression, targeting subversive elements throughout the country.  This only served 
to draw even more criticism from Washington, however, fuelling the growing distrust between the 
two countries.        
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A Conspiracy in the Making: China‟s Response to Pressure over Liu Xiaobo (2010-2011) 
 
The awarding of Liu with the Nobel Peace Prize caused great uproar amongst Chinese leaders, most 
of whom saw the move as a blatant insult to China‟s political sovereignty.278  Diplomatic relations 
with Norway entered a period of tension, and countries around the world were warned not to attend 
Liu‟s award ceremony.  At the same time, Beijing embarked on a wave of internal repression, 
clamping down on Liu‟s supporters and colleagues throughout the country.279  Charter 08 signatories 
were detained and interrogated by the police, and Liu‟s wife, Liu Xia, was kept under house arrest and 
round-the-clock surveillance.  An information blackout was also enacted on reports related to Liu‟s 
Nobel Prize, while the state media initiated a campaign defending the government‟s stand on the 
issue.  Beijing had become convinced that it was facing a political siege, and it interpreted the US‟s 
focus on its human rights record as an attempt to undermine the CCP.
280
  This, argued state leaders, 
would result in political turbulence in China, leading ultimately to the weakening of the country.
281
  
The party‟s clamp down on dissension, therefore, was a response to this perceived threat, and it was 
aimed at shoring up its political stability.
282
  Beijing‟s strong reaction, however, was viewed as 
excessive by US analysts, contributing as a result to Washington‟s impression of China‟s growing 
assertiveness.
283
    
 
                                                          
278
 People‟s Daily Online, Awarding Liu Xiaobo Nobel Peace Prize may harm China-Norway Relations, says 
FM Spokesman (8 Oct 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7160053.html#, viewed 11 July, 
2011; Jing, Men, „Between Human Rights and Sovereignty‟, pp. 548-49. 
 
279
 Arch Puddington, „The Freedom House Survey for 2010: Democracy under Duress‟, Journal of Democracy, 
22, no. 2 (Apr 2011), pp. 17, 20-21, 29-30. 
 
280
 The New York Times, Beijing Calls Nobel Insult to Chinese People (12 Oct 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/world/asia/13china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011; People‟s Daily 
Online, China Questions “True Intentions”. 
 
281
 People‟s Daily Online, Beijing Firm on Nobel (10 Dec 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/ 
90776/90883/7226837.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
282
 Potter, „4 June and Charter 08, pp. 131-32. 
 
283
 The New York Times, Nobel Winner‟s Absence may Delay Awarding of Prize (18 Nov 2010), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/11/19/world/asia/19nobel.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
62 
 
Chinese officials had initially warned the Nobel Committee against awarding the prize to Liu, 
declaring that the move constituted an affront to China‟s judicial sovereignty.284  The dissident was a 
convicted criminal in the eyes of Beijing, and his sedition against the state thus made him an 
inappropriate choice for the prestigious accolade.
285
  Government leaders were livid, therefore, when 
Liu‟s award was confirmed in October, leading immediately to the suspension of high-level 
diplomatic exchanges with Norway.
286
  The Norwegian Ambassador, moreover, was summoned for a 
dressing down in Beijing, demonstrating the displeasure which Chinese leaders felt over the Nobel 
Committee‟s decision.287  Policy makers described the award as an attempt to humiliate China, 
particularly at a time when the country seemed to be in an ascendency.
288
  They were convinced, 
furthermore, of the implications the prize could have on the Party‟s authority, especially in the light of 
growing international support for Liu.
289
  In the weeks following the Nobel Committee‟s 
announcement, therefore, Chinese officials began applying pressure on various countries to boycott 
Liu‟s award ceremony.  Beijing issued official demarches to numerous embassies, cautioning them 
against any expression of tribute to Liu.
290
  At the same time, Vice-Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai 
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denounced the apparent politicisation of the Nobel Prize, echoing his ministry‟s standpoint on the 
futility of assailing China‟s political system.291 
 
16 countries eventually avoided the award ceremony in Oslo at Beijing‟s behest, allowing China to 
claim a small victory against the Nobel Committee.
292
  Nevertheless, US pressure on China‟s human 
rights record failed to recede, prompting even fiercer reactions from the Chinese.  Beijing identified 
Washington‟s focus on Liu as not only an intrusion in its internal affairs, but also as an attempt to 
weaken its political stability.
293
  It objected vehemently, therefore, to Congress‟s passing of H. RES. 
1717, describing the move as emblematic of the US‟s „arrogant and rude attitude‟ towards China.294  
Chinese leaders, moreover, protested against Washington‟s Human Rights Country Report on China, 
arguing that the article served no purpose other than to vilify Beijing internationally.
295
  As a further 
response to the damning report, Beijing issued its own account of the US‟s human rights abuses, 
identifying issues, such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as examples of Washington‟s human 
rights hypocrisy.
296
  The US, Chinese officials asserted, was in no position to lecture China on its 
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treatment of Liu, especially in the light of its own human rights deficiencies.
297
  Washington, they 
advised, needed to focus instead on respecting China‟s political and judicial sovereignty, as only then 
could relations improve between the two countries.
298
   
 
Beijing‟s vigorous defence of its human rights record stemmed from the belief that domestic forces 
were being agitated against the regime.
299
  Washington‟s support of Liu, Chinese officials anxiously 
observed, threatened to empower dissident movements in China, risking an erosion of the Party‟s 
political stability.
300
  Ever haunted by the trauma of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the CCP was 
only too ready to respond to any perceived threat to the state.
301
   Consequently, a wave of repression 
swooped over the country following the announcement of Liu‟s award, targeting colleagues of Liu 
and fellow signatories of Charter 08.  Liu‟s wife, Liu Xia, was amongst the first to be subject to 
Beijing‟s clamp down on dissent, with the state confining her to her apartment under house arrest.302  
She was also placed under round-the-clock police surveillance, with authorities setting up a guard 
house next to the couple‟s residence in Beijing.303  Despite calls from the US for her release, the 
Chinese government continued to restrict her movements, even preventing her from receiving her 
husband‟s prize in Oslo.304  This, however, attracted more criticism from Washington, which only 
contributed further to Beijing‟s deepening anxieties.  Chinese rights activists and lawyers, such as Mo 
Shaoping and He Weifang, were also placed on strict travel restrictions, with the state fearing the 
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consequences of a dissident turn out at Oslo.
305
  At the same time, a rigorous censorship campaign 
was put in place across the country, with the Internet, television, and other forms of media filtered of 
information related to Liu‟s accolade.306               
 
The state‟s censorship campaign blocked off almost all access to Liu‟s work, ensuring that his theses 
and lectures on democracy remained barred from public view.
307
  Online forums, blogs, and bulletin 
boards were also monitored for any mention of the dissident, purging virtually all traces of Liu from 
the Internet.
308
  This tightening of information, however, was also accompanied by an official media 
campaign, designed expressly to defend Beijing‟s stand on Liu.  Conducted chiefly by state media 
organs, such as the newspapers People‟s Daily and Global Times, the campaign centred on the topics 
of the Nobel Prize and Liu‟s alleged criminality.  A series of editorials, for instance, emphasised the 
threat which the dissident posed to China‟s stability, accusing him of attempting to overthrow China‟s 
political system.
309
  Had Liu succeeded, the editorials declared, it would have thrown the country into 
chaos, destroying all the achievements accumulated through China‟s development.310  Liu‟s 
conviction was thus justified, and the state media admonished the US for its attempt to weaken China 
through the Nobel Prize.
311
  The editorials drew attention, moreover, to Washington‟s friendship with 
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fellow Nobel laureate, the Dalai Lama, accusing the US of colluding with individuals regarded as 
separatists in Beijing.
312
  The award, argued the editorials, was hence nothing more than a tool used to 
“contain” China, polarising its people in an attempt to restrain its growth.313  The Chinese people, 
therefore, owed it to themselves to reject the Prize and its associated values, and embrace instead the 
Party‟s principles of reform and stability.314   
 
To demonstrate the appeal of the government‟s position, the Global Times conducted a poll in 
October, indicating Chinese attitudes towards Liu‟s accolade.315  The data released showed that more 
than half of Chinese perceived Liu‟s prize with some disdain, with many insisting on an apology from 
the Nobel Committee.  Additionally, almost 20 percent of individuals polled felt that the West was out 
to vilify China, using the award to discriminate unfairly against Beijing.  The government‟s stand on 
the issue was therefore vindicated, with a majority of Chinese expressing support for Liu‟s 
incarceration.  To convey their contempt for the Prize, several Chinese citizens even went as far as to 
create their own award for the promotion of world peace.  Terming it, the Confucius Peace Prize, the 
organisers intended to use their award to illustrate the meaning of „peace from an Eastern 
perspective‟.316  Consequently, the inaugural Prize was bestowed upon a former Taiwanese diplomat, 
Lien Chan, specifically for his role in improving the China-Taiwan relationship.
317
  In this way, the 
organisers were able to portray “stability” as a main aspect in Chinese conceptions of peace, 
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reinforcing the official principles of the Party.
318
  China‟s growth, declared officials, would be 
jeopardised should the country adopt the values espoused by the US and the Nobel Committee.
319
  
The state‟s harsh stance on Liu, therefore, was seen as justified, especially in the interest of preserving 
China‟s continued stability.320     
 
Beijing‟s heavy-handed response to Liu‟s award was driven, therefore, by the Party‟s deepening 
political anxieties.  It perceived the Nobel Prize as an attack on its monopoly over power, and feared 
that it would inspire dissident groups across the country.  This would have jeopardised the crucial 
stability which underscored the country‟s growth, bringing to an end China‟s hitherto phenomenal 
economic development.  The government was thus reluctant to give in to US pressure over Liu, and 
instead stepped-up its efforts to bolster its political security.  As the next section will show, however, 
the Nobel Prize remained but part of the White House‟s wider effort to pressure Beijing on its 
apparent human rights deficiencies.  The issue of Internet freedom, in particular, had been raised as 
early as January, during China‟s standoff with Google, contributing partly to Beijing‟s growing 
anxieties.  The ensuing Arab Spring likewise amplified the threat perceptions of the CCP, which had 
begun by then to perceive itself as under siege.  All these issues converged to intensify the political 
insecurities of the Party, prompting it to take increasingly repressive actions to guarantee its power 
base.  These moves, however, only served to attract further criticism from Washington, adding to the 
apprehensions of the Party.  The two countries found themselves trapped, therefore, in a spiral of 
escalating tension through the course of 2010, with each side adopting ever increasingly assertive 
actions.   
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The Plot Thickens: Google, Internet Freedom and the “Jasmine Revolution” (2010-2011) 
 
In January 2010, Internet search engine giant, Google, announced that it was ending its cooperation 
with Chinese Internet censors, paving the way for its departure from the mainland market.
321
   While it 
backtracked on its decision just five months later, its initial moves had nevertheless called into focus 
the issue of China‟s Internet censorship.322  The White House immediately picked up the topic and 
began pressing Beijing to cease its regulatory activities.
323
  It criticised Beijing for suppressing its 
citizens‟ rights to free speech, and proclaimed its support for Internet freedom in the country.324  
These moves, however, deepened the anxieties of Chinese leaders, and contributed to their harsh 
reaction in the lead up to Liu‟s Nobel award.  It created the perception that Beijing was under a 
political siege, with the US utilising the Web as a means to destabilise the Party.
325
  Hence, when an 
online attempt was made to broaden the “Jasmine Revolution” to China in the wake of the Arab 
Spring, Chinese state regulators swooped into action.  They tightened up the information environment 
across all avenues of the media, and launched a fresh wave of repression against dissidents across the 
country.  Just as before, however, Beijing‟s strong reaction triggered even more expressions of 
disapproval from Washington, which began to sharpen its rhetoric against the Party.
326
  This in turn 
further intensified the CCP‟s threat perceptions, effectively locking the two countries in a running 
dispute over the issue of human rights.  
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Google predicated its departure from the mainland market on its opposition to Beijing‟s strict Internet 
censorship regime.  It declared that it would end its compliance with the Chinese government‟s rules 
on Web filtering, and began redirecting its users to the company‟s less regulated services in Hong 
Kong.
327
  Citing its official motto, “Don‟t be evil”, Google stated that it could no longer tolerate 
Beijing‟s attempts to „limit free speech on the Web‟, emphasising thereby the failings in China‟s 
human rights practices.
328
  Its actions attracted the attention of the White House, and President Obama 
issued a statement expressing his support for Google‟s stand against censorship.329  This was quickly 
followed by Clinton‟s call on „American companies to challenge foreign governments‟ demands for 
censorship and surveillance‟, articulated in her much-publicised speech on Internet freedom.330  
Speaking at the Newseum in Washington, a building dedicated to the value of a free press, Clinton 
proclaimed the US‟s defence of a free Internet as Washington‟s newest policy objective.331  Calling it, 
“21st Century Statecraft”332, the policy would include the development of new tools and resources to 
help „groups around the world‟ circumvent „politically motivated censorship‟, providing in the 
process „equal access to knowledge and information ... for all of humanity‟.333  Washington, in 
addition, would provide such groups with both funding and training, allowing them thereby „to 
advance democracy and human rights‟ in their respective countries.334     
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Congress was also quick to express its support for Google, with then-Speaker of the House, Nancy 
Pelosi expressing her commendation of the company.
335
  This was immediately followed by the 
introduction of a series of bills in Congress, all of which attempted to ban US companies from dealing 
with informationally repressive regimes.
336
  S.RES. 405, for instance, reaffirmed the centrality of 
freedom of speech and expression to the US, and condemned China for stifling these universal rights 
for its citizens.
337
  Similarly, H.R 5694 conveyed support for a „single, open, global Internet‟, and 
denounced countries that adopted stringent regulative policies.
338
  Five senators, in addition, 
submitted an appeal to Clinton, urging her to increase the funding to projects supporting the 
circumvention of Internet censorship.
339
  Software programmes, such as Psiphon, Freegate, and Tor, 
they argued, were crucial in helping people bypass regulative “firewalls”, aiding therefore in the 
promotion of freedom and democracy.
340
  Their views were supported, moreover, by research and 
testimonies presented to Congress, highlighting the merits of these new technologies.
341
  As a result, 
                                                          
335
 The New York Times, Far-Ranging Support for Google‟s China Move (15 Jan 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/world/asia/15china.html?ref=freedomandhumanrights, viewed 10 July, 
2011. 
 
336
 Govtrack.us, H.RES. 1512: Commending Google Inc. and other companies for advocating for an uncensored 
Internet, adhering to free speech principles, and keeping the Internet open for users worldwide (2010), 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hr111-1512, viewed 15 July, 2011; Govtrack.us, H.R. 1389: 
Global Online Freedom Act of 2011 (2011), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-1389, viewed 
15 July, 2011. 
 
337
 Govtrack.us, S.RES. 405 A Resolution Reaffirming the Centrality of Freedom of Expression and Press 
Freedom as Cornerstones of United States Foreign Policy and United States Efforts to Promote Individual 
Rights, and for other Purposes (2010), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sr111-405, viewed 15 
July, 2011. 
 
338
 Govtrack.us, H.R. 5694: One Global Internet Act of 2010 (2010), http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-5694, viewed 15 July, 2011. 
 
339
 The New York Times, Aid Urged for Groups Fighting Internet Censors (21 Jan 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/technology/21censor.html&ref=freedomandhumanrights, viewed 10 July, 
2011. 
 
340
 Congressional Research Service, US Initiatives to Promote Global Internet Freedom: Issues, Policy, and 
Technology, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41120_20100405.pdf, viewed 23 July, 2011, pp. 22-23. 
 
341
 Ibid.; US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2010 Report to Congress (Nov 2010), 
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2010/annual_report_full_10.pdf, viewed 23 July, 2011. 
71 
 
further attention was turned towards the funding of the private sector, ensuring that they played a part 
in Washington‟s Internet freedom strategy.342  
 
Pressure from Washington regarding China‟s Internet regulations persisted throughout 2010, 
encompassing eventually the issue of Liu‟s Nobel accolade.  Beijing‟s clamp down on the Web 
following Liu‟s award, in particular, led the US to intensify its demands on the Chinese to end their 
censorship activities.
343
  Party leaders, however, were adamant on their stand on the issue, and insisted 
on the legality of their actions.
344
  They defended their right to regulate the Internet in their own 
country, and criticised the US for its attempt to interfere in Beijing‟s internal affairs.345  A white paper 
on China‟s Internet regulations was released, moreover, in support of the government‟s stand on the 
Internet.
346
  It listed the scope of freedoms provided to Chinese netizens under the country‟s Internet 
laws, and identified the transmission of subversive information as a clear violation of these 
regulations.
347
  Liu‟s conviction for his role in Charter 08 was thus sanctioned under China‟s judicial 
system, and Chinese authorities continued to refute Washington‟s censure of Beijing‟s regulatory 
actions.
348
  Chinese officials also criticised the US‟s politicisation of China‟s standoff with Google, 
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arguing that enterprises dealing in China had a clear responsibility to abide by Chinese regulations.
349
  
The persistence of Washington‟s pressure, however, continued to heighten the anxieties of the Party, 
with policy makers growing increasingly wary of a US plot to undermine China through its Internet 
freedom policy.
350
 
 
These fears increased dramatically in the wake of the Arab Spring, especially after calls for spreading 
the “Jasmine Revolution” to China surfaced on several overseas Chinese websites.351  Arising initially 
on the popular online forum, Boxun.com, these calls requested that people take to the streets in China 
in protest of the Party‟s apparent oppression.352  In addition, organisers encouraged demonstrators to 
chant slogans, such as “we want food, we want work, we want housing, we want fairness”, 
emphasising their discontent with the government‟s performance.353  Participants were instructed, 
moreover, to target major Chinese cities, replicating thereby the large-scale rallies that were taking 
shape in numerous Arab countries.
354
  Despite all the groundwork and precautions that went into 
organising the rallies, however, the demonstrations failed in the end to materialise.  Only a handful of 
people turned up to the prescribed venues in the cities, and even fewer were seen actually 
protesting.
355
  Chinese authorities were nevertheless alarmed enough to launch an extensive 
suppression campaign, targeting political dissidents and democracy advocates throughout the 
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country.
356
  Described by the US media as China‟s „biggest crackdown on progressive thought in 
years‟, this campaign witnessed the arrests and incarceration of numerous activists regarded as 
politically dangerous to the state.
357
  Even the prominent artist, Ai Weiwei, had been taken into 
custody in April, demonstrating the grave apprehensions which Chinese leaders held over the Jasmine 
issue.
358
  At the same time, Chinese censors began scouring the Internet for all traces of information 
surrounding the “Jasmine Revolution”, shutting down access to a number of websites frequented by 
the short-lived movement.
359
   
 
It was clear, therefore, from Beijing‟s reaction that US pressures on Internet freedom had significantly 
deepened the political apprehensions of China‟s leaders.360  Their paranoia surrounding the threat of a 
“Jasmine Revolution” prompted one of the harshest and extensive political crackdowns in the 
country‟s recent history.  Its reaction, however, drew even more criticism from the White House, 
turning the issue into a subject of fierce debate at the April US-China Humans Rights Dialogue in 
Beijing.  During those talks, Assistant Secretary of State Michael Posner stated Washington‟s alarm at 
the rate which China‟s human rights record was deteriorating, emphasising that this represented a 
stumbling block in the bilateral relationship.
361
  Chinese leaders, for their part, continued to defend 
their regulatory actions in the face of mounting US pressure, dismissing Washington‟s criticisms over 
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Liu and Beijing‟s censorship policies.362  This apparent intransigence over the issue of human rights, 
however, clearly infuriated US officials, trapping both sides in a running dispute that continues to 
strain ties between the two countries.
363
 
 
 
Conclusion: One Country‟s Dissident is Another Country‟s Freedom Fighter 
 
The awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo marked a significant event for democracy 
activists and human rights advocates throughout China.  Many had petitioned the Nobel Committee to 
honour Liu with the award, arguing that his long and peaceful struggle for reform made him ideally 
suited for the prestigious accolade.
364
  In addition, his inclusion into the distinguished ranks of Nobel 
laureates, they argued, would serve as a clear message to China‟s authoritarian regime, “naming and 
shaming” Beijing in the eyes of the international community.   
 
Ultimately, however, this message became eclipsed in the midst of one of China‟s largest crackdowns 
on dissident activity in its recent history, prompted primarily by Liu‟s Nobel decoration.  Despite the 
pressure which countries like the US applied on Beijing, Chinese authorities remained adamant in 
their stand on human rights.  They viewed the Nobel Prize as an intrusion upon their national 
sovereignty, and stood firm against this perceived attack on their political power.  China‟s stability 
and continued development would be jeopardised, officials argued, should the country allow itself to 
become polarised by topics like democracy.  Hard-earned achievements accumulated over the years 
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would thus be lost, and „China would disintegrate‟ to the benefit of its foreign rivals.365  Hence, 
Washington‟s pressure, in this context, served only to fuel Chinese suspicions, hardening Beijing‟s 
resolve to act assertively over the debate on human rights.  Its reluctance to free the imprisoned Liu, 
and its persisting clampdown on dissidence, however, made it more difficult in turn for the White 
House to ease the pressure on Beijing.  Eventually, both sides found themselves locked in a running 
dispute over these controversial issues, contributing ultimately to the straining of their bilateral 
relationship.
366
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Conclusion 
 
 
Over the past year, observers have claimed that China has become more assertive on the international 
stage.  Its apparent determination to resist US overtures over the valuation of its currency, and its 
seeming failure to adopt firm measures against North Korea following the Cheonan‟s sinking, fuelled 
perceptions that the country‟s diplomatic posture had taken a more aggressive turn.  Likewise, the 
White House was equally critical of China‟s human rights record, describing Beijing‟s recent 
persecution of Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo as a stumbling block to better relations.  Consequently, 
academics and politicians in Washington called into question the country‟s “peaceful rise”, suggesting 
instead that China was making a challenge on the existing US-led global order.  US pressure on China 
over these issues was thus strengthened through the course of 2010, with experts seeking to break 
down Beijing‟s intransigence.  In the end, however, all this achieved was to deepen the anxieties of 
officials in Beijing, convincing them that the US was attempting to constrain a rising China.  Chinese 
leaders, as a result, became even more determined to resist US entreaties, illustrating the ultimately 
counterproductive nature of Washington‟s pressure.    
 
What these three cases studies have illustrated, therefore, are the difficulties which countries like the 
US have in adapting to a rising China.
367
  Relations with Beijing are often seen in zero-sum terms by 
politicians in Washington, making compromise an almost unachievable goal in interactions of 
strategic importance.
368
  Furthermore, any side‟s attempt to assert authority over an issue is, more 
often than not, interpreted as a move in an aggressive direction.  Nowhere has this been exemplified 
more clearly than in the three case studies examined within this thesis.  By viewing China through the 
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lens of a potential aggressor, Beijing‟s inflexibility became immediately associated in Washington 
with the notion of growing Chinese assertiveness.  In the process, the considerations of Chinese 
authorities were ignored, resulting in the critical misrepresentation of Beijing‟s strategic intentions.  
As this paper has maintained, far from acting out of a position of power, officials in China were in 
fact operating out of a state of anxiety and perceived vulnerability.
369
  Their apprehensions over their 
political stability and economic progress fuelled their resolve to stand firm against US pressure, 
maintaining instead China‟s time-tested means of incremental reform.370  The more Washington 
attempted to force Beijing‟s hand in the issues, therefore, the more apprehensive Chinese leaders 
became, convincing them in the end of the US‟s apparent malicious motives.  Their harsh crackdown 
on dissent in the wake of Liu‟s Nobel award was thus carried out in this vein, demonstrating the effect 
US pressure had on the Chinese leadership.  For all their apparent insight into Beijing‟s statecraft, 
analysts in Washington nevertheless failed to pick up on this, choosing instead to perceive Beijing‟s 
intransigence as a sign of its assertiveness.  In the end, it was this critical miscalculation which 
prevented the US from gaining progress in any of these issues, leading ultimately to the deterioration 
in the bilateral relationship. 
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Appendix A.  US Congressional Bills related to the RMB 
 
 
 
Bill number:  H.R. 1875    Sponsor:  Rep. Peter DeFazio  
Introduced:  2 April 2009  
 
Bill Summary:  To establish the Emergency Trade Deficit Commission.  The Commission‟s mission would be 
to investigate the nature, causes and consequences of the US‟s trade deficits and provide 
recommendations on how to address and reduce structural trade imbalances with countries 
like China.   
  
 
 
 
 
Bill number:  S. 1027     Sponsor:  Sen. Debbie Ann Stabenow 
Introduced:  13 May 2009 
 
Bill Summary: A bill to amend title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify that fundamental exchange-rate 
misalignment by any foreign nation is actionable under United States countervailing and 
antidumping duty laws, and for other purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bill number:  H.R. 2378    Sponsor: Rep. Timothy Ryan 
Introduced: 13 May 2009 
 
Bill Summary: To amend title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify that countervailing duties may be 
imposed to address subsidies relating to a fundamentally undervalued currency of any foreign 
country.  
 
 
 
 
 
Bill number:  S. 1254     Sponsor:  Sen. Charles Schumer 
Introduced: 11 June 2009 
 
Bill Summary:  A bill to provide for identification of misaligned currency, require action to correct the 
misalignment, and for other purposes.   
 
 
 
 
 
Bill number:  S. 1982     Sponsor:  Sen. Sherrod Brown 
Introduced:  28 October 2009 
 
Bill Summary:  A bill to renew and extend the provisions relating to the identification of trade enforcement 
priorities, and for other purposes.  The Bill would identify foreign county practices, such as 
currency misalignment, that have negative effects on employment in the US and seek to 
correct them. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bill number:  S. 3134     Sponsor:  Sen. Charles Schumer 
Introduced:  17 Mar 2010 
 
Bill Summary:  A bill to provide for identification of misaligned currency, require action to correct the 
misalignment, and for other purposes.  The bill provides for a countervailing duty that would 
be implemented on any country found guilty of currency misalignment. 
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Bill number:  H.R. 6071    Sponsor: Rep. Brad Sherman 
Introduced: 30 July 2010 
 
Bill Summary: To withdraw normal trade relations treatment from the products of the People's Republic of 
China, to provide for a balanced trade relationship between that country and the United States, 
and for other purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bill number:  H.R. 639    Sponsor: Rep. Sander Levin 
Introduced: 10 February 2011 
 
Bill Summary:  To amend title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify that countervailing duties may be 
imposed to address subsidies relating to a fundamentally undervalued currency of any foreign 
country. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bill number:  S. 328     Sponsor:  Sen. Sherrod Brown 
Introduced:  14 February 2011 
 
Bill Summary:  A bill to amend title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify that countervailing duties may be 
imposed to address subsidies relating to fundamentally undervalued currency of any foreign 
country, such as China. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bill number: H.R. 1518    Sponsor: Rep. Mark Critz 
Introduced:  13 April 2011 
 
Bill Summary: To amend section 310 of the Trade Act of 1974 to strengthen provisions relating to the 
identification of United States trade expansion priorities.  The Bill would identify foreign 
country practices, such as currency manipulation, that provide exports from these countries 
with a competitive edge. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bill number:  H.R. 1603    Sponsor: Rep. Peter DeFazio 
Introduced: 15 April 2011 
 
Bill Summary: To establish the Emergency Trade Deficit Commission.  The Commission‟s mission would be 
to investigate the nature, causes and consequences of the US‟s trade deficits and provide 
recommendations on how to address and reduce structural trade imbalances with countries 
like China. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bill number:  S. 1130     Sponsor:  Sen. John Rockefeller 
Introduced:  26 May 2011 
 
Bill Summary: A bill to strengthen the United States trade laws and for other purposes.  This bill identifies 
currency manipulation as a form of countervailable subsidy, subject to countervailing duties. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bill number: H.Res. 310    Sponsor:  Rep. Mark Critz 
Introduced:  16 June 2011 
 
Bill Summary: Providing for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 639) to amend title VII of the Tariff Act of 
1930 to clarify that countervailing duties may be imposed to address subsidies relating to a 
fundamentally undervalued currency of any foreign country. 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Chinese Newspapers 
 
China Daily, American Intimidation (17 Jul 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-07/17/content_ 
10118733.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, An Irritating Naval Exercise that puts Sino-US Ties at Risk (14 Jul 2010), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-07/14/content_11020445.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
 
China Daily, Appreciation must Proceed „Gradually‟ (19 Oct 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
10/19/content_11426015.htm, viewed 14 March, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Avoid Clashes, Wen Says (31 May 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-05/31/ 
content_9909177.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Big Brother Flexes Muscles (31 Jul 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-
07/31/content_11075547.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, China Circled by Chain of US Anti-Missile Systems (22 Feb 2010), http://www. 
chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-02/22/content_11016099.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, China Neutral on Korean Issue (07 Dec 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-
12/07/content_11661406.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
81 
 
China Daily, China Reaffirms its Hope for Restraint over ROK Warship Sinking (26 May 2010), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-05/26/content_9895805.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, China Rebuffs US Criticisms over DPRK (29 Jun 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ 
world/2010-06/29/content_10036807.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, China Set to be Top Economy by 2030 (24 Mar 2011), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-
03/24/content_12220043.htm, viewed 25 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, China‟s Shrinking Trade Surplus (9 Feb 2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/project/ 
2011-02/09/content_11970604.htm, viewed 20 March, 2011. 
 
China Daily, China to Continue Exchange Rate Reform: Official (28 Jul 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com. 
cn/bizchina/2010-07/28/content_11062772.htm, viewed 14 March, 2011. 
 
China Daily, China Won‟t Yield to Yuan Appreciation Pressure: Premier (27 Dec 2009), http://www.chinadaily. 
com.cn/china/2009-12/27/content_9234322.htm, viewed 20 February, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Chinese Exporters Fear sharp Rise in Yuan (2 Oct 2010), http://www.chinadaily. com.cn/m/ 
shandong/e/2010-10/02/content_11375162.htm, viewed 14 March, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Clinton Urges China Action (26 May 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-05/26/ 
content_9892963.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Cold War Mindset Harms Peace (13 Aug 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-08/13 
/content_11150598.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Do Not Politicize Renminbi Float Issue, China Tells US (15 Jun 2010), http:// 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-06/15/content_9978120.htm, viewed 14 March, 2011. 
 
82 
 
China Daily, DPRK Willing to Return to Nuclear Talks, Says Kim (08 May 2010), http://www. 
chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-05/08/content_9824315.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Easing of Tension Possible (29 Nov 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-
11/29/content_11621414.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Games Americans Play (07 Aug 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-08/07/ 
content_11113923.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Muscle Flexing (26 Jul 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-07/26/content_ 
11046722.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Navy Drill Cause for Concern (12 Jul 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-
07/12/content_10091991.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, US Needs Sincerity to Cement Military Ties (09 Jun 2010), http://www.chinadaily 
.com.cn/opinion/2010-06/09/content_9956616.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, US Should Rethink Strategy (22 Nov 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/20100-
11/22/content_11590433.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, US Supports S. Korea over Ship (26 May 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-
05/26/content_9897004.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Two Koreas Exchange Fire: US Experts Expect China to get Tougher (24 Nov 2010), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-11/24/content_11601367.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, US Supports SKorea‟s Response on Warship (24 May 2010), http://www.chinadaily. 
com.cn/world/2010-05/24/content_9887306.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
83 
 
China Daily, What‟s Behind US Pressure on Renminbi Exchange Rate? (20 Feb 2010), http://www. 
chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-02/20/content_9476381.htm, viewed 20 February, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Why China Opposes US-South Korean Military Exercises in the Yellow Sea (19 Jul 2010), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-07/19/content_10122308.htm, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Wen Insists on Gradual Appreciation of Yuan (14 Mar 2011), http://www. 
chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2011-03/14/content_12167195.htm, viewed 20 March, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Wen Stands Firm on Yuan (15 Mar 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-
03/15/content_11016842.htm, viewed 14 March, 2011. 
 
China Daily, Yuan‟s Appreciation „won‟t Alleviate US Woes‟ (21 Feb 2011), http://www.chinadaily. 
com.cn/usa/china/2011-02/21/content_12060291.htm, viewed 20 March, 2011. 
 
Global Times, 6 of 10 Chinese Demand Norway Apologise: Survey (18 Oct 2010), http://www.globaltimes.cn/ 
china/society/2010-10/582916_2.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
Global Times, Arms Sales Help US Extend its Sphere of Influence (28 Dec 2010), http://www. 
globaltimes.cn/opinion/commentary/2010-12/604721_2.html, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
Global Times, China Blasts Nobel Peace Prize Decision (9 Oct 2010), http://china.globaltimes.cn/ 
chinanews/2010-10/580125.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
Global Times, Clinton‟s Internet Freedom Speech Sparks Worries (22 Jan 2010), http://world. 
globaltimes.cn/americas/2011-04/500293.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
Global Times, Indifferent Response to Moves for Protests in China as few Heed Call (21 Feb 2011), 
http://china.globaltimes.cn/society/2011-04/625132.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
84 
 
Global Times, The Nobel Prize an Open Insult to China‟s Legal System (12 Oct 2010), http://opinion. 
globaltimes.cn/observer/2010-10/580993.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
Global Times, US Backing Pushed Japan into Diaoyu Clash (27 Sep 2010), http://opinion. 
globaltimes.cn/commentary/2011-04/577794.html, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
Global Times, US Taiwan Missile Deal Irks Beijing (08 Jan 2010), http://www.globaltimes.cn/ 
china/diplomacy/2010-01/497069_2.html, viewed 24 May, 2011. 
 
Global Times, US to Launch Chinese Twitter Feeds (17 Feb 2011), http://www.globaltimes.cn/ 
world/americas/2011-02/623831_2.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Acting Against the Will of Alfred Nobel (25 Oct 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7175452.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Analysts Say China Should Not Yield to Obama‟s Hardline on Yuan (9 Feb 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6891455.html, viewed 4 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Awarding Liu Xiaobo Nobel Peace Prize may harm China-Norway Relations, says FM 
Spokesman (8 Oct 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7160053.html#, 
viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Beijing Firm on Nobel (10 Dec 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/ 
90776/90883/7226837.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Beijing: Google, Foreign firms must Abide by Chinese Law (19 Jan 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6873173.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Blindness to China‟s Efforts on the Peninsula (29 Jun 2010), http://english.people.com. 
cn/90001/90780/91343/7044161.html#, viewed 25 May, 2011. 
85 
 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China Conducts 2 Military Drills: Reports (29 Jul 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/ 
90001/90776/7084761.html#, viewed 25 May, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China Expresses Firm Opposition to US Resolution on Liu Xiaobo (9 Dec 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7226477.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China has Backing of More than 100 countries, Organisations on Nobel Peace Prize (7 
Dec 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7223844.html#, viewed 11 July, 
2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China Hits back at some Western politicians‟ support for Nobel Peace Prize (11 Dec 
2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7227743.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China Issues Lurk Behind Obama‟s visit to Asia (16 Nov 2010), http://english.people. 
com.cn/90001/90780/91343/7201357.html#, viewed 25 May, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China‟s March Deficit Shows Currency not Cause of Trade Imbalance: Spokesman (12 
Apr 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90861/ 6946574.html, viewed 4 March, 
2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China Questions “True Intentions” of Award of Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo (12 
Oct 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7164027.html#, viewed 11 July, 
2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China Rejects Criticism on Yuan, Defends Exchange Rate Policy (19 Mar 2010), http:// 
english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/6924192.html, viewed 4 March, 2011. 
 
86 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China Says Ties with Norway Affected by Nobel Committee‟s Decision to Award Peace 
Prize to Chinese Criminal (2 Dec 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/ 
90883/7219367.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China: US Meddling not Welcome (10 Apr 2011), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7345252.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China Voices Cautious Optimism on Exports Recovery, Urges US to Loosen High-Tech 
Ban (7 Mar 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/6911143.html, viewed 4 March, 
2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, China‟s Economic Stability, Development Contributes to Global Recovery: President 
(10 Nov 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/ 7195063.html, viewed 9 March, 
2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Domestic Consumption “Key to Solve Trade Rows” (13 Sep 2010), http:// 
english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/7138055.html, viewed 9 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Exchange Rate Largest Concern for Chinese Exporters (17 Apr 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90861/6954544.html, viewed 4 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, FM Refutes US Claims China Restricts Internet (24 Jan 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6877134.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Foreign Experts Warn of Sharp Appreciation of Yuan (16 Nov 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90859/7200218.html, viewed 9 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Foxconn hikes Salary by Nearly 70 pct after Serial Suicides (08 Jun 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7016484.html, viewed 22 April, 2011. 
 
87 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Google Totally Wrong: Chinese Gov‟t (24 Mar 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/ 
90001/90778/90860/6929360.html, viewed 11  July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Google Tweaks Search Engine (21 Jul 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/ 
90001/90778/90858/90864/7074474.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Gradual Political reform Good for China (15 Oct 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7166877.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Highlights: Premier Wen‟s Government Work Report (6 mar 2011), http:// 
english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/7309789.html, viewed 19 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, How Long will Jeers for the West Last? (9 Dec 2010), http:// 
english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/7225743.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Japan to Send Observers to US-S. Korea Joint Drill (23 Jul 2010), http:// 
english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/7078895.html#, viewed 25 May, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Key Targets of China‟s 12th Five-Year Plan (5 Mar 2011), http://english. 
people.com.cn/90001/90776/7309132.html, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Lien Chan Awarded 1st Confucius Peace Prize (9 Dec 2010), http:// 
english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7225684.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Man Arrested for alleged Agitation Aimed at Subverting Gov‟t (24 Jun 2009), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6685182.html, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Minister: Stable Yuan Beneficial to the Stability to the World Economy (20 Jan 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90861/6873727.html, viewed 4 March, 2011. 
 
88 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Nation can Stomach 5-6 Percent Yuan Rise in 2011 (9 Nov 2010), http://english.people. 
com.cn/90001/90778/90859/7192706.html, viewed 9 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Nobel Committee Harbours Political Motives behind Prize to Liu Xiaobo: Experts (10 
Dec 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7226555.html#, viewed 11 July, 
2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Official: Currency Reform “Our Own Affair” (28 Jun 2010), http://english. 
people.com.cn/90001/90778/90859/7042952.html, viewed 9 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Pentagon‟s Distortion on China‟s Military (19 Aug 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/ 
90001/90776/90883/7109022.html#, viewed 25 May, 2011. 
 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Protectionism, Yuan Pressure “unfair”: Wen (1 Dec 2009), http://english.people.com. 
cn/90001/90778/90859/6828776.html, viewed 4 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, President Hu Pledges Currency Reform (25 May 2010), http://english.people.com. 
cn/90001/90776/90883/6997598.html, viewed 4 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Pressure on Yuan „Not Justified‟ (26 Feb 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/ 
90001/90776/90883/6902874.html, viewed 4 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Renminbi Not Undervalued as Real Exchange Rate Increases: UN Expert (19 Jan 2011), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/7265153.html, viewed 10 March, 2011.  
 
People‟s Daily Online, RMB Appreciation Pressure Harmful to Interests of China, EU (9 Oct 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91421/7161021.html, viewed 9 March, 2011. 
 
89 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Senior Chinese Official Says Appreciation of RMB Not Good Recipe for US-China Trade 
Deficit (25 Mar 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/ 6930325.html, viewed 4 
March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Senior Chinese Official Visits DPRK to Promote Bilateral Ties (09 Oct 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7161085.html#, viewed 25 May, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Sino-Us Ties not a “Zero-sum” Game (13 Dec 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/ 
90001/90776/90785/7228529.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, The Endless Ideological Wars against China (14 Oct 2010), http://english.people.com. 
cn/90001/90780/91342/7166129.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, The Nobel Committee Owes China an Apology (18 Oct 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7168671.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Unwise to Elevate “South China Sea” to be Core Interest? (27 Aug 2010), http:// 
english.people.com.cn/90002/96417/7119874.html#, viewed 25 May, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, US Devaluation Condemned (5 Nov 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/ 
90001/90778/90859/7189147.html, viewed 9 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, US has Serious Human Rights Abuses: China (11 Apr 2011), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7345710.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, US Show of Force in Asian Waters a Threat to China: Magazine (15 Aug 2010), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/7104788.html#, viewed 25 May, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, US-S. Korea Drill Aimed at fall of North (26 Aug 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/ 
90001/90777/90852/7117920.html#, viewed 25 May, 2011. 
90 
 
 
People‟s Daily Online, West Risks its own Downfall with Arrogance (12 Oct 2010), http:// 
english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/7162863.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, White Paper Explains “Internet Sovereignty” (9 Jun 2010), http://english.people.com. 
cn/90001/90776/90785/7018637.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Why we Snub Oslo? (13 Oct 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/ 
90002/96417/7165353.html#, viewed 11 July, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, World Bank Official Says no Case for Revaluation (31 March 2010), http:// 
english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90859/6935409.html, viewed 4 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Yuan Appreciation will Not Help Sino-US Trade Deficit: China FM Spokeswoman (16 
Sep 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90859/ 7142649.html, viewed 9 March, 
2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, Yuan Comes under Pressure (29 Jan 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/ 
90778/90859/6882173.html, viewed 4 March, 2011. 
 
People‟s Daily Online, “Yuan Exchange Rate Issue” Only Western Countries‟ Excuse for Low Competitiveness 
(9 Mar 2010), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90859/ 6913537.html, viewed 4 March, 
2011. 
Xinhua News Agency, China Issues First Anti-Corruption White Paper, Pledging Firmer Actions (29 Dec 
2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-12/29/c_13669348.htm, viewed 20 
April, 2011. 
 
Xinhua News Agency, China Sees First Trade Deficit in 6 Years, Small March Trade Surplus (11 Apr 2011), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/video/2011-04/11/c_13823211.htm, viewed 20 April, 
2011. 
91 
 
 
Xinhua News Agency, China Urges Separation of Kim‟s Visit, Warship Sinking amid “Partiality” Criticism (08 
May 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-05/08c_13282626.htm, viewed 15 
May, 2011. 
 
Xinhua News Agency, FM Press Conference on Sept. 30 (30 Sep 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
english2010/china/2010-09/30/c_13537725.htm, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
Xinhua News Agency, Getting a Fair Slice of China‟s Economic Cake (27 Feb 2011), http:// 
news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-02/27/c_13752516.htm, viewed 20 April, 2011. 
 
Xinhua News Agency, U.S.-Proposed Anti-Subsidy Probe Against Chinese Goods Violates WTO Rules: MOC 
Spokesman (30 Sep 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-09/30/c_13537 
092.htm, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
 
US & International Newspapers  
 
Bloomberg, US, Philippine Militaries Discussed China‟s „Assertiveness‟ at Meeting (18 Aug 2010), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-08-18/u-s-philippine-militaries-discussed-china-s-
assertiveness-at-meeting.html, viewed 16 May, 2011. 
 
Financial Times, US Business Hardens Stance on Renminbi (23 Mar 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/82d97868-
36a1-11df-b810-00144feabdc0.html, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
Financial Times, US Hardens Stance on Renminbi Rigidity (16 Oct 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7b301ff2-
b9e4-11de-a747-00144feab49a.html, viewed 10 march 2011. 
 
Financial Times, US Retreats from Attack on Renminbi (5 Feb 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0e2fba6c-
30bb-11e0-9de3-00144feabdc0.html, viewed 12 March, 2011. 
92 
 
 
Financial Times, US Shows Appetite for Action (23 Mar 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/a63e5a62-3697-11df-
b810-00144feabdc0.html, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, 19 Countries to Skip Nobel Ceremony, While China Offers its Own Prize (7 Dec 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/world/08nobel.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, A Good Fight (23 Jan 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/23/opinion/ 
23sat3.html?ref=freedomandhumanrights&gwh=9F3D16CB26BE3BD08B7FEB8C6D6A38E3, 
viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, A Manifesto on Freedom Sets China‟s Persecution Machinery in Motion (1 May 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/world/asia/01beijing.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 
2011. 
 
The New York Times, After Google‟s Stand on China, US Treads Lightly (15 Jan 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/world/asia/15diplo.html?ref=freedomandhumanrights&gwh=86E8
FED4F2A3657F8ACD82B95E86EEE0, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Aid Urged for Groups Fighting Internet Censors (21 Jan 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/technology/21censor.html&ref=freedomandhumanrights, viewed 
10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, An Overlooked Way to Create Jobs (28 Sep 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/opinion/an-overlooked-way-to-create-jobs.html?_r=1&ref= 
todayspaper, viewed 30 September, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Another Firm Rebuff by China of Currency Criticism (16 Mar 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/business/global/17iht-yuan.html?ref=yuan, viewed 17 
March, 2011. 
93 
 
 
The New York Times, As Tensions Rise, US and S. Korea Begin Drills (25 Jul 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26korea.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Beijing Calls Nobel Insult to Chinese People (12 Oct 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/world/asia/13china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 
2011. 
 
The New York Times, Bleak Outlook for Us-China Talks on Human Rights (27 Apr 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/asia/28china.html?ref=freedomandhumanrights, 
viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China: 2 Intellectuals Barred from Leaving the Country (3 Dec 2010), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/asia/04briefs-Nobel.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Acts to Reduce Oil Spill Threat (23 Jul 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/07/24/world/asia/24china.html?ref=china, viewed 20 June, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China, Angered by Peace Prize, Blocks Celebration (9 Oct 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/world/asia/10china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Assails New US Policy on Internet Freedom (17 Feb 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/asia/18beijing.html?ref=freedomandhumanrights, 
viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Assails Nobel Peace Prize as „Card‟ of West (5 Nov 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/06/world/asia/06nobel.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 
2011. 
 
94 
 
The New York Times, China Balks at Criticism of North Korea (30 May 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/05/31/world/asia/31korea.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Bars Travel for 2 Rights Advocates (9 Nov 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/world/asia/10china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 
2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Central Bank Chief Backs Gradual Rise in Currency (8 Oct 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/business/global/09imf.html?ref=yuan, viewed 17 March, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Indicts Prominent Dissident (12 Dec 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/12/12/world/asia/12china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Moves to Block Foreign News on Nobel Prize (9 Dec 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/world/asia/10china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy (15 Aug 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html?pagewanted=1, viewed 20 August, 
2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Policy Main Topic for the G-20 (13 Apr 2011), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2011/04/14/business/global/14summit.html?ref=china, viewed 15 April, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Pushes Back Against Calls for Yuan Rise (30 Nov 2009), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/business/global/01yuan.html?ref=yuan, viewed 17 March, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Rejects US Complaints on its Currency (4 Feb 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/world/asia/05diplo.html?ref=yuan, viewed 17 march, 2011. 
 
95 
 
The New York Times, China Returns US Criticism over Sinking of Korean Ship (30 Jun 2010), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DEEDE153CF933A05755C0A966, viewed 
15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Urges Europeans to Snub Nobel Ceremony (4 Nov 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/world/asia/05china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China: US Accused of Rights Violations (11 Apr 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/04/12/world/asia/12briefs-Chinarights.html, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, China Wearily Eyes US-Korea Drills (20 Jul 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/07/21/world/asia/21military.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Chinese Cancel Meeting with Norwegian Minister (11 Oct 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/world/asia/12china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Chinese Defend Detention of Artist on Grounds of “Economic Crimes” (7 Apr 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/world/asia/08china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 
2011. 
 
The New York Times, Chinese Military Seeks to Extend its Naval Power (23 Apr 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Citing Recession, US again Pressures China on Revaluing Currency (18 Mar 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/19/business/global/19yuan.html?ref=yuan, viewed 17 March, 
2011. 
 
The New York Times, Clinton Condemns Attack on South Korean Ship (21 May, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/22/world/asia/22diplo.html, viewed 15 May 2011. 
 
96 
 
The New York Times, Clinton Tries to Diffuse Asian Tension (13 Jan 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/world/asia/13diplo.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Departing US Envoy Criticises China on Human Rights (6 Apr 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/world/asia/07china.html, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Draft Avoids Condemning North Korea in Ship Attack (8 Jul 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/world/asia/09nations.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Eye on China, House Votes for Greater Tariff Powers (29 Sep 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/business/30currency.html?ref=yuan, viewed 17 March, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Far-Ranging Support for Google‟s China Move (15 Jan 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/world/asia/15china.html?ref=freedomandhumanrights, 
viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, For Small Employers, Shedding Workers and Tears (6 May 2009), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/05/07/us/07layoff.html?scp=13&sq=manufacturing+sector+worst+hit&s
t=nyt, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Gates Warns of North Korea Missile Threat to US (11 Jan 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/world/asia/12military.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Geithner to Signal Tougher Stance on China Currency (15 Sep 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/business/global/16yuan.html?ref=yuan, viewed 17 March, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Google, Citing Attack, Threatens to Exit China (12 Jan 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/world/asia/13beijing.html?scp=2&sq=google%20china&st=
cse, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
97 
 
The New York Times, Human Rights Advocates Vanish as China Intensifies Crackdown (11 Mar 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/world/asia/12china.html?ref=freedomandhumanrights, 
viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Large Oil Spill Reported In China (03 Jan 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/01/04/world/asia/04china.html?ref=china, viewed 21 June, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Lead Sickens 11,300 Children in China (20 Aug 2009), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/world/asia/21china.html?ref=china, viewed 20 June, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Leading China Dissident gets 11-Year Term for Subversion (25 Dec 2009), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/25/world/asia/25china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 20 June, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Little Progress on North Korea as china Talks End (26 May 2010), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE4DD1038F935A15756C0A966, viewed 15 
May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Major Ship in US Fleet Will Visit South Korea (19 Jul 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/20/world/asia/20 military.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Mr. Geithner and China (17 Sep 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/09/18/opinion/18sat1.html?ref=yuan, viewed 17 March, 2011.  
 
The New York Times, N. Korea Warns of Response to UN (15 Jun 2010), http://nytimes.com/ 
2010/06/16/world/asia/16korea.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Nobel Winner‟s Absence may Delay Awarding of Prize (18 Nov 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/world/asia/19nobel.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
98 
 
The New York Times, Obama Ends G-20 Summit with Criticism of China (12 Nov 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/11/13/business/global/13group.html?ref=yuan, viewed 17 March, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Obama Pushes Hu on Rights but Stresses Ties to China (19 Jan 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/world/asia/20prexy.html?ref=freedomandhumanrights&gwh
=420E78F434B0CA2F4CEA822CCD2CCAD3, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Obama Urges China to Check North Koreans (6 Dec 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/world/asia/07diplo.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Offering to Aid Talks, Us Challenges China on Disputed Islands (23 Jul 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html, viewed 15 May, 2011.  
 
The New York Times, Petition Urges Nobel for Jailed Chinese Writer (25 Sep 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/asia/26prize.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 
2011. 
 
The New York Times, Rapid Declines in Manufacturing Spread Global Anxiety (19 Mar 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/business/worldbusiness/20shrink.html?scp=1&sq=US+manu
facturing+sector+&st=nyt, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Security Council Blinks (10 Jul 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/ 
opinion/11sun3.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Strike in China Highlights Gap in Workers‟ Pay (28 May 2010), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/05/29/business/global/29honda.html?ref=laborissues, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Taking Harder Stance toward China, Obama Lines Up Allies (25 Oct 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/world/asia/26china.html?ref=yuan, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
99 
 
The New York Times, Taking On China (30 Sep 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/ 
opinion/01krugman.html?scp=1&sq=taking%20on%20china&st=cse, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Tainted Dairy Products Seized in Western China (9 Jul 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/07/10/world/asia/10china.html?ref=melamine&gwh=5A59B4F58FDBA
BDDBBCADE347846C7D4, viewed 20 June, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Tension Precedes US-China Meeting on Human Rights (22 Apr 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/world/asia/23china.html?ref=freedomandhumanrights, 
viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Tirades against Nobel aim at Audience in China (10 Dec 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/11/world/asia/11china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 
2011. 
 
The New York Times, Unrest May Signal New Phase in China Economy (29 May 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/business/global/30strike.html?ref=laborissues, viewed 21 April, 
2011. 
 
The New York Times, US Envoy Sees “Backsliding” of Human Rights in China, (28 Apr 2011), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2011/04/29/world/asia/29china.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, US Prods China to Punish North Korea over Warship (24 May 2010), http://query. 
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1339F937A15756C0A9669, viewed 15 May, 
2011. 
 
The New York Times, US Stands with an Ally, Eager for China to Join the Line (26 May 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/world/asia/27clinton.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
100 
 
The New York Times, US Will Counter Chinese Arms Buildup (8 Jan 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/01/09/world/asia/09military.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Well-oiled Security Apparatus in China Stifles Calls for Change (28 Feb 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/world/asia/01china.html viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, White House Seeks Chinese Help with N. Korea (24 Nov 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/world/asia/25korea.html, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, With Strike, Toyota Idles Auto Plant in China (22 Jun 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/06/23/business/global/23strike.html?ref=laborissues, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Winner of Beijing‟s Peace Award is also Absent (9 Dec 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/world/asia/10confucius.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Winner‟s Chair Remains Empty at Nobel Event (10 Dec 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/12/11/world/europe/11nobel.html?ref=liuxiaobo, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, Workers Let Go By China‟s Banks are Putting Up a Fight (15 Aug 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/world/asia/16china.html?ref=laborissues, viewed 21 April, 2011. 
 
The New York Times, World Briefing/United Nations; Condemnation of Ship‟s Sinking is a „Victory‟, North 
Korean Says (10 Jul 2010), http://query.nytimes/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02E0DC1138F933A2 
5754C0A9669, viewed 15 May, 2011. 
 
Reuters, Exclusive: China Crackdown Driven by Fears of a Broad Conspiracy (12 Apr 2011), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/12/us-china-politics-crackdown-idUSTRE73B19E201 10412, 
viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
Reuters, China ex-Minister Warns of US Monetary “Narcotic” (3 Mar 2011), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/03/03/us-china-economy-trade-idUSTRE7221 LJ20110303, viewed 23 March, 2011. 
101 
 
 
Reuters, China Fends off Obama Pressure over North Korea (29 Jun 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2010/06/29/us-china-usa-korea-idUSTRE65S1PI20100629, viewed 16 May, 2011. 
 
Reuters, China High on Agenda for Obama‟s Asia Tour – Aide (2 Nov 2010), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2010/11/02/obama-asia-idUSN0223588220101102, viewed 16 May, 2011. 
 
Reuters, China Internal Security Spending Jumps Past Army Budget (5 Mar 2011), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/03/05/us-china-unrest-idUSTRE7222RA20110305, viewed 15 August, 2011. 
 
Reuters, China Posts Trade Deficit in Sign of Rebalancing (10 Apr 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article /2011/ 
04/11/businesspro-us-china-economy-trade-idUSTRE73A24H20110411, viewed 15 April, 2011. 
 
Reuters, China Says US Human Rights Outcry is Interference (9 Apr 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/04/09/us-china-usa-rights-idUSTRE7382EH20110409, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
Reuters, China‟s Wen puts Social Stability at Heart of Economy (27 Feb 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/02/27/us-china-economy-wen-idUSTRE71Q07F20110227, viewed 23 March, 2011. 
 
Reuters, Key Comments from Chinese Premier Wen‟s Online Talk (27 Feb 2011), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/02/27/us-china-wen-quotes-idUSTRE71Q0QO 20110227, viewed 23 March, 2011. 
 
Reuters, Lawmakers Try Again for China Yuan Bill (10 Feb 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/ 
10/us-usa-china-currency-idUSTRE71973 F20110210, viewed 22 March, 2011. 
 
Reuters, Obama Says there must be Consequences for Korea Ship Sinking (26 Jun 2010), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/27/us-g20-northkorea-usa-idUSTRE65Q00I20100627, viewed 
16 May, 2011. 
 
Reuters, US Ends Rights Talks with China “Deeply Concerned” (28 Apr 2011), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/04/28/us-china-us-rights-idUSTRE73R2H820110428, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
102 
 
 
Reuters, US Military Moves in Asia not Aimed as China: Gates (7 Nov 2010), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2010/11/07/us-usa-australia-idUSTRE6A51SR20101107, viewed 16 May, 2011. 
 
Sify, US Discusses China‟s „Assertiveness‟ with India (10 Aug 2010), http://www.sify.com/news/us-discusses-
china-s-assertiveness-with-india-news-national-kjjvucddegd.html, viewed 17 May, 2011. 
 
The Wall Street Journal, Friend or Foe? How Americans See China (13 Jan 2011), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748703791904576076271559977248.html, viewed 24 April, 2011. 
 
The Washington Post, China Lowers its Economic Growth Target a Tad (27 Feb 2011), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/27/AR2011022702639_pf.html, 
viewed 12 March, 2011.   
 
The Washington Post, China‟s New World Order Demands Stronger US Response (24 Jan 2011),  http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/23/AR2011012302895_pf.html, 
viewed 12 March, 2011.  
 
Washington Post, Defence Minister Toshimi Kitazawa on Japan‟s Regional and US Relations (13 Jan 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/13/AR2011011302765, viewed 
16 May, 2011. 
 
The Washington Post, Hu Jintao Meets with Lawmakers, Hears Concerns on Human Rights (20 Jan 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/19/AR2011011 905092_pf.html, 
viewed 12 March, 2011. 
 
The Washington Post, Obama Discusses China‟s Civil Liberties with Advocates in White House Meeting (13 Jan 
2011),http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/13/AR2011011306922. 
Html, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
 
The Washington Post, Sen. Harry Reid Calls Hu Jintao a “Dictator” (19 Jan 2011), http://voices. 
washingtonpost.com/44/2011/01/harry-reid-calls-hu-jintao-a-d.html, viewed 10 July, 2011. 
103 
 
Chinese Government Sources 
 
Ministry of Commerce of the People‟s Republic of China, China to Increase Flexibility of the RMB Exchange 
Rate (20 Mar 2011), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/counselorsoffice/ 
westernasiaandafricareport/201103/20110307455972.html, viewed 5 April, 2011. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‟s Republic of China, China Renews Warning on US Arms Sales to 
Taiwan (08 Jan 2010), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2010-01/08/content_4116560.htm, viewed 18 
May, 2011. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‟s Republic of China, China to Halt Military Exchanges, Punish US 
Companies for Arms Sales to Taiwan (31 Jan 2010), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2010-
01/31/content_4122029.htm, viewed 18 May, 2011. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‟s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's 
Regular Press Conference on December 7, 2010 (9 Dec 2010), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ 
xwfw/s2510/t775546.htm, viewed 23 July, 2011. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‟s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu‟s 
Remarks on the Report of the US Department of Defence on Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People‟s Republic of China (19 Aug 2010),  http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/ 
s2510/2535/ t725450.htm, viewed 18 May, 2011. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‟s Republic of China, Premier Wen Jiabao Meets the Press (14 Mar 
2010), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t673753.htm, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
State Council Information Office of the People‟s Republic of China, Full Text: The Internet in China (8 Jun 
2010), http://www.gov.cn/english/2010-06/08/content_1622956.htm, viewed 23 July, 2011. 
 
 
104 
 
US Government Sources 
 
Congressional Research Service, US Initiatives to Promote Global Internet Freedom: Issues, Policy, and 
Technology, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41120_20100405.pdf, viewed 23 July, 2011. 
 
Govtrack.us, H.R. 1389: Global Online Freedom Act of 2011 (2011), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=h112-1389, viewed 15 July, 2011. 
 
Govtrack.us, H.R. 5694: One Global Internet Act of 2010 (2010), http://www.govtrack.us/ congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=h111-5694, viewed 15 July, 2011. 
 
Govtrack.us, H.RES. 1512: Commending Google Inc. and other companies for advocating for an uncensored 
Internet, adhering to free speech principles, and keeping the Internet open for users worldwide 
(2010), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hr111-1512, viewed 15 July, 2011. 
 
Govtrack.us, S.RES. 405 A Resolution Reaffirming the Centrality of Freedom of Expression and Press Freedom 
as Cornerstones of United States Foreign Policy and United States Efforts to Promote Individual 
Rights, and for other Purposes (2010), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sr111-405, 
viewed 15 July, 2011. 
 
Humanrights.gov, Secretary Clinton‟s Interview With Jeff Goldberg of The Atlantic (7 Apr 2011), http:// 
www.humanrights.gov/2011/05/10/secretary-clintons-interview-with-jeff-goldberg-of-the-
atlantic/, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2010 Report to Congress (Nov 2010), 
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2010/annual_report_full_10.pdf, viewed 23 July, 2011. 
 
US Congress, „Bipartisan, Bicameral Group of Lawmakers Call for Action on China Currency Manipulation‟ 
(10 Feb, 2011),  http://faircurrency.org/legislation.html, viewed 24 June, 2011. 
 
105 
 
US Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ros-Lehtinen Delivers Letter to Hu Outlining Security, Human 
Rights Concerns Also Presses him to Free Nobel-Laureate, other Dissidents (20 Jan 2011), 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press_display.asp?id=1690, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
US Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Testimony of Phelim Kine, Asia Researcher, Human Rights Watch 
(13 May 2011), http://chrissmith.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Testimony_-_Kine.pdf, viewed 22 
July, 2011.  
 
US Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Testimony of Yang Jianli at Congressional Briefing (19 Jan 2011), 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/jia011911.pdf, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
US Congress, H.RES. 1717: Congratulating Imprisoned Chinese Democracy Advocate Liu Xiaobo on the 
Award of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize, http://chrissmith.house.gov/UploadedFiles/HRes_1717 
_Liu_Xiaobo_Nobel_Congratulations.pdf, viewed 15 July, 2011. 
 
US Congress, Open Letter to President Barack Obama (14 Jan 2011), http://www.stark.house.gov/ 
images/stories/112/letters/20110114china.pdf, viewed 15 July, 2011. 
 
US Congress, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Letter to Secretary Clinton and Secretary Geithner (27 
Apr 2011), http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/letters_112th/Letter%20to%20Clinton-Geithner%20-
%20China%20HR.pdf, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
US Department of Defence, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People‟s Republic of China (2010), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf, 
viewed 21 June, 2011. 
 
US Department of Defence, Ballistic Missile Defence Review Report (Feb 2010), http://www.defense.gov/ 
bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf, viewed 21 June, 2011. 
 
106 
 
Us Department of Defence, Naval Exercise Wraps up in South Korea (01 Dec 2010), http:// 
www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61909, viewed 19 May, 2011. 
 
US Department of Defence, US-Korean Defence Leaders Announce Exercise Invincible Spirit (20 Jul 2010), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60074, viewed 19 May, 2011. 
 
US Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) (8 Apr 
2011), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eap/154382.htm, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
US Department of State, 21st Century Statecraft Homepage, http://www.state.gov/statecraft/overview/ 
index.htm, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
US Department of State, Briefing on the US-China Human Rights Dialogue (14 May 2010), \http:// 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/141899.htm, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
US Department of State, Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a Networked World (15 Feb 
2011), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
US Department of State, Nobel Peace Prize Awarded to Liu Xiaobo (8 Oct 2010), http://www.state.gov/ 
secretary/rm/2010/10/149235.htm, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
US Department of State, Press Availability at U.S. Embassy Beijing (28 Apr 2011), http:// 
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2011/162414.htm, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
US Department of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (21 Jan 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/ 
rm/2010/01/135519.htm, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
US Department of State, Remarks to the Press on the Release of the 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices (8 Apr 2011), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2011/160393.htm, viewed 22 July, 
2011. 
107 
 
 
US Department of State, Secretary Clinton: Travel to Asia (08 Nov 2010), http://www.state.gov/ 
secretary/trvl/2010/149864.htm, viewed 18 May, 2011. 
 
US Department of the Treasury, Report to Congress on International Economics and Exchange Rate Policies 
(Feb 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-policies/ 
Documents/Foreign%20Exchange%20Report%20February%204%202011.pdf, viewed 10 March, 
2011. 
 
US Department of the Treasury, Report to Congress on international Economics and Exchange Rate Policies (8 
Jul 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-policies/ 
Documents/Foreign%20Exchange%20Report%20July%202010.pdf, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
US Embassy, Beijing, Remarks by Ambassador Jon M. Huntsman Jr. at the Barnett-Oksenberg Lecture (6 Apr 
2011),  http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/040611amb.html, viewed 15 July, 2011. 
 
US Navy, George Washington Strike Group Begins Exercise with Republic of Korea (28 Nov 2010), 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=57421, viewed 19 May, 2011. 
 
The White House, Fact Sheets: The United States and Indonesia - Building a 21st Century Partnership (09 Nov 
2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/09/fact-sheets-united-states-and-
indonesia-building-a-21st-century-partners, viewed 18 May, 2011. 
 
The White House, Fact Sheet: US-India Defence Cooperation (2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/india-factsheets/US-India_Defense_Cooperation.pdf, viewed 19 May, 2011. 
 
The White House, Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India (08 Nov 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-
prime-minister-singh-india, viewed 18 May, 2011. 
 
108 
 
The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, Special Assistant to the President and 
Senior Director for Asian Affairs Jeff Bader, and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic 
Communications Ben Rhodes (23 Sep 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2010/09/23/press-briefing-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-special-assistant-president-, viewed 
24 June, 2011. 
 
The White House, Press Conference by the President After G20 Meetings in Seoul, Korea (12 Nov 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/12/press-conference-president-after-g20-
meetings-seoul-korea, viewed 24 June, 2011. 
 
The White House, Press Conference with President Obama and President Hu of the People's Republic of China 
(19 Jan 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-
president-obama-and-president-hu-peoples-republic-china, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
The White House, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (27 Jan 2010), http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address, viewed 24 June, 2011. 
 
The White House, Statement by NSC Deputy Spokesman Ben Chang on the meeting between National Security 
Advisor Tom Donilon, Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara of Japan, and Foreign Minister Kim Sung-
hwan of the Republic of Korea (06 Dec 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/ 
12/06/statement-nsc-deputy-spokesman-ben-chang-meeting-between-national-securi, viewed 18 
May, 2011. 
 
The White House, Statement by the President on the Awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize (10 Dec 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/10/statement-president-awarding-nobel-
peace-prize, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Republic of Korea Navy Ship the Cheonan (19 May 
2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-press-secretary-republic-korea-
navy-ship-cheonan, viewed 18 May, 2011. 
109 
 
 
The White House, US-China Joint Statement (19 Jan 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement, viewed 22 July, 2011. 
 
 
Other Sources 
 
AmCham-China, 2010 White Paper on the State of American Business in China (10 May 2010), http:// 
amchamchina.org/article/6309, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
AmCham-China, 2011 White Paper on the State of American Business in China (25 Apr 2011), http:// 
www.amchamchina.org/article/7908, viewed 26 April, 2011. 
 
American Economic Alert, China‟s Currency Cheating Destroys U.S. Factories and Jobs,  http:// 
americaneconomicalert.org/view_topic.asp?Prod_ID=3104, viewed 20 April, 2011. 
 
Bergsten, C. Fred, „A Proposed Strategy to Correct the Chinese Exchange Rate‟, Congressional Testimony, 
http://www.piie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=1656, viewed 16 April, 2011. 
 
Boxun News, AP Exclusive: Voices behind China's Protest Calls (6 Apr 2011), 
http://www.boxun.us/news/publish/chinanews/AP_Exclusive_Voices_behind_China_s_protest_ca
lls.shtml, viewed 15 July, 2011. 
 
East Asia Forum, Who Deserves the First Confucius Peace Prize? (23 Dec 2010), http://www.eastasiaforum.org 
/2010/12/23/who-deserves-the-first-confucius-peace-prize/, viewed 15 July, 2011. 
 
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011: The Authoritarian Challenge to Democracy (13 Jan 2011), http:// 
www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1310, viewed 14 July, 2011. 
 
110 
 
Gagnon, Joseph (and Gary Haufbauer), „Taxing China‟s Assets: How to Increase US Employment Without 
Launching a Trade War‟, Foreign Affairs Magazine (25 Apr, 2011), pp. 1-3. 
 
Gallup, China and the US: Competing for Political Influence (22 May 2009), http://www.gallup 
.com/poll/118591/China-Competing-Political-Influence.aspx?version =print, viewed 24 June, 
2011. 
 
Gallup, Economy, Jobs Easily Top Problems in Americans‟ Minds (21 Sep 2010), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/143135/Economy-Jobs-Easily-Top-Problems-Americans-Minds.aspx, 
viewed 24 June, 2011. 
 
Gallup, Gallup Daily: US Employment, http://www.gallup.com/poll/125639/Gallup-Daily-Workforce.aspx, 
viewed 18 July, 2011. 
 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Schumer, „Graham Withdraw China Tariff Bill as Bush 
Administration Pushes Long Term Approach‟ (05 Oct 2006), http://info.hktdc.com/alert/ 
us0620a.htm, viewed 17 March, 2011. 
 
Human Rights Watch, China: Joint Letter to President Obama, January 2011 (13 Jan 2011), 
http://www.hrw.org/node/95447, viewed 14 July, 2011. 
 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 9th IISS Asia Security Summit: Second Plenary Session – 
Q&A (05 Jun 2010), http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-
dialogue-2010/plenary-session-speeches/second-plenary-session/copyof-ma-xiaotian/, viewed 
18 may, 2011. 
 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 9th IISS Asia Security Summit: First Plenary Session – 
Q&A (05 Jun 2010), http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-
2010/plenary-session-speeches/first-plenary-session/robert-gates/qa/, viewed 19 May, 2011. 
 
111 
 
International Monetary Fund, People‟s Republic of China: 2010 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report; Staff 
Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion (Jul 2010), http:// 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10238.pdf, viewed 14 March, 2011. 
 
Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Korea, Joint Investigation Report on the Attack against ROK 
Ship Cheonan (2010), http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/reports/ Cheonan.pdf, 
viewed 19 May, 2011. 
 
The New York Review of Books, Perry Link, trans., Charter 08 (15 Jan 2009), http:// 
www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/jan/15/chinas-charter-08/, viewed 15 July, 2011. 
 
Nobel Peace Prize, Announcement: The Nobel Peace Prize for 2010 (8 Oct 2010), 
http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/laureates/laureates-2010/announce-2010/, viewed 10 July, 
2011. 
 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief: Estimates of Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange 
Rates, May 2010 (Jun 2010), http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb10-15.pdf, viewed 21 April, 
2011. 
 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Op-ed: Beijing is Key to Creating more US Jobs (14 Apr 2010), 
http://www.piie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=1545, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Op-ed: China‟s Currency and the US Economy (1 Nov 2010), 
http://www.piie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=1700, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief: Renminbi Undervaluation, China‟s Surplus, and 
the US Trade Deficit (Aug 2010), http://www.piie.com/publications/ interstitial.cfm?ResearchID 
=1636, viewed 10 March, 2011. 
 
112 
 
Vision of Humanity, Global Peace Index: Related Indicators – 2010, http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-
data/#/2010/gini/CN/detail, viewed 21 May, 2011. 
 
Yahuda, Michael, „Public Opinion and Regionalism in Northeast Asia‟ (Nov 2010), 
http://mansfieldfdn.org/backup/polls/pdf/Yahuda_commentary.pdf, viewed 12 May, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
 
Altman, Roger C. (and Richard N. Haass), „American Profligacy and American Power: The Consequences of 
Fiscal Irresponsibility‟, Foreign Affairs Magazine (Nov/Dec 2010), pp. 1-10. 
 
Beck, Peter, „North Korea in 2010: Provocations and Succession‟, Asian Survey, 51, no. 1 (2011), pp. 33-40. 
 
Beckman, Robert, „South China Sea: Worsening Dispute or Growing Clarity in Claims?‟, RSIS Commentaries 
(Aug 2010), pp. 1-3. 
 
Bell, Daniel A., „Why China Won‟t Follow Arab Revolt‟, New Perspectives Quarterly, 28, no. 2 (Spring 2011), 
pp. 10-13. 
 
Bergsten, Fred C. (with Charles Freeman, Nicholas Lardy and Derek Mitchell), China‟s Rise: Challenges and 
Opportunities (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009). 
 
Bert, Wayne, „Assessing China: The Obama Administration Looks at a Rising Power‟ (23 February 2011), pp. 
1-45. 
 
Burdekin, Richard C. K., China‟s Monetary Challenges: Past Experiences and Future Prospects (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
 
113 
 
Chang, Gordon G., „Halfway to China‟s Collapse‟, Far Eastern Economic Review, 169, no. 5 (Jun 2006), pp. 
25-28. 
 
Charlton, Andrew, „Bitter Fruits: China‟s Twelfth Five-Year Plan‟, The Monthly (June, 2011), pp. 20-26. 
 
Chase, Michael S., „Chinese Suspicion and US Intentions‟, Survival, 53, no. 3 (May 2011), pp. 133-50. 
 
Christensen, Thomas J., „Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama 
Administration‟, The Washington Quarterly, 32, no. 3 (2009), pp. 89-104. 
 
Christensen, Thomas J., „The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing‟s Abrasive Diplomacy‟, 
Foreign Affairs, 90, no. 2 (March 2011), pp. 54-67. 
 
Clarke, Ryan, „Vassal States and Core National Interests: Rethinking China‟s Relationships with North Korea 
and Myanmar‟, The RUSI Journal, 156, no. 1 (Feb/Mar 2011), pp. 46-51. 
 
Clegg, Jenny, China‟s Global Strategy: Towards a Multipolar World (New York: Pluto Press, 2009). 
 
Cline, William R. (and John Williamson), „Estimates of the Equilibrium Exchange Rate of the Renminbi: Is 
There a Consensus and, If Not, Why Not?‟, in Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, eds., 
Debating China‟s Exchange Rate Policy (Washington: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2008), pp. 131-54. 
 
Cooney, Kevin J., „Chinese-American Hegemonic Competition in East Asia: A New Cold War or into the Arms 
of America?‟, in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato, eds., The Rise of China and International 
Security (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 38-58.  
 
Cossa, Ralph A., „The Sino-US Relationship: Respecting Each Other‟s Core Interests‟, American Foreign 
Policy Interests, 32, no. 5 (2010), pp. 269-75. 
 
114 
 
Cunningham, Maura E. (and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom), „Interpreting Protest in Modern China‟, Dissent, 58, no. 1 
(Winter 2011), pp. 13-18. 
 
Dai, Meixing, „Motivations and Strategies for a Real Revaluation of the Yuan‟, MPRA Paper, no. 30440 (April 
2011), pp. 1-28.  
 
Fang, Cai (and Kam Wing Chan), „The Global Economic Crisis and Unemployment in China‟, Eurasian 
Geography and Economy, 50, no. 5 (2009), pp. 513-31. 
 
Fawley, Brett (and Luciana Juvenal), „Why “Fixing” China‟s Currency is No Quick Fix‟, The Regional 
Economist (April 2011), pp. 4-5. 
 
Forsythe, David P., „US Foreign Policy and human Rights: Situating Obama‟, Human Rights Quarterly, 33 
(2011), pp. 767-89. 
 
Frankel, Jeffrey A. (and Shang-Jin Wei), „Assessing China‟s Exchange Rate Regime‟, NBER Working Paper, 
no. 13100 (May 2007), pp. 1-79. 
 
Friedberg, Aaron L., A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011). 
 
Friedman, Edward, „China: A Threat to or Threatened by Democracy‟, Dissent, 56, no. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 7-
12. 
 
Futter, Andrew, „Getting the Balance Right: US Ballistic Missile Defence and Nuclear Nonproliferation‟, 
Comparative Strategy, 30, no. 3 (Jul 2011), pp. 254-67. 
 
Gagnon, Bruce K., „US Space Technology for Controlling China and Russia‟, Peace Review: A Journal of 
Social Justice, 22, no. 1 (2010), pp. 17-24. 
 
115 
 
Gertz, Bill, The China Threat: How the People‟s Republic Targets America (Washington D.C.: Regnery 
Publishing Inc., 2002). 
 
Gill, Bates, „China‟s North Korea Policy: Assessing Interests and Influences‟, United States Institute of Peace, 
Special  report 283 (Jul 2011), pp. 1-14. 
 
Godement, Francois, „The United States and Asia in 2010: Uncertain Relations‟, Asian Survey, 51, no. 1 (2011), 
pp. 5-17. 
 
Goh, Evelyn, „US Strategic Relations with a Rising China: Trajectories and Impacts on Asia-Pacific Security‟, 
in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato, eds., The Rise of China and International Security (New 
York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 59-93. 
 
 Goldstein, Morris (and Nicholas Lardy), „China‟s Exchange Rate Policy: An Overview of Some Key Issues‟, in 
Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, eds., Debating China‟s Exchange Rate Policy 
(Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008), pp. 1-60. 
 
Hader, Leon T., „Mr. Hu Goes to Washington‟, Cato Institute (18 Jan 2011), http://www.cato.org/ 
pub_display.php?pub_id=12711, viewed 24 March, 2011. 
 
Halper, Stefan, The Beijing Consensus (New York: Basic Books, 2010). 
 
Hanke, Steve H., „American‟s „Plan‟ to Destabilise China‟, Cato Institute (21 Oct 2010), http://www.cato.org/ 
pub_display.php?pub_id=12492, viewed 24 March, 2011. 
 
Hemmings, John, „The Potential for Sino-US Discord in the South China Sea‟, The RUSI Journal, 156, no. 2 
(Apr/May 2011), pp. 90-95. 
 
116 
 
Herrmann, Christoph, „Don Yuan: China‟s “Selfish” Exchange Rate Policy and International Economic Law‟, in 
C. Hermann and J. P. Terhechte, eds., European Yearbook of international Economic Law 2010 
(Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2010), pp. 31-51. 
 
Hua, Ralph, „China‟s Arsenal of Political Persecution‟, Pace International Law Review Online Companion, 2, 
no. 4 (Nov 2010), pp. 1-27. 
 
Huang, Yiping, „What Caused China‟s Current-Account Surplus?‟, (16 April, 2010), http://www.voxeu.org/ 
index.php?q=node/4877, viewed 20 March, 2011. 
 
Hufbauer, Gary C. (and Claire Brunel), „The US Congress and the Chinese Renminbi‟,  in Morris Goldstein and 
Nicholas Lardy, eds., Debating China‟s exchange Rate Policy (Washington: Peterson Institute for 
international Economics, 2008), pp. 219-33. 
 
Hughes, Christopher R., „Google and the Great Firewall‟, Survival, 52, no. 2 (Apr/May 2010), pp. 19-26. 
 
Hofman, Bert (and Louis Kujis), „Rebalancing China‟s Growth‟, in Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, eds., 
Debating China‟s exchange Rate Policy (Washington: Peterson Institute for international 
Economics, 2008), pp. 109-22. 
 
Ikenson, Daniel J., „China Trade and American jobs‟, Cato Institute (2 Apr, 2010), http://www.cato.org/ 
pub_display.php?pub_id=11652, viewed 23 March, 2011. 
 
Jing, Men, „Between Human Rights and Sovereignty – An Examination of EU-China Political Relations‟, 
European Law Journal, 17, no. 4 (Jul 2011), pp. 534-50. 
 
Jun, Jing, „Environmental Protest in Rural China‟, in Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden, eds., Chinese Society: 
Change, Conflict and Resistance (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 197-214. 
 
117 
 
Kaplan, Stephen B., „The Political Obstacles to Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility in China‟, World 
Development, 34, no. 7 (2006), pp. 1182-1200. 
 
Keidel, Albert, „China‟s Economic Rise – Fact and Fiction‟, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Policy Brief: 61 (July 2008), pp. 1-15. 
 
Kwak, Tae-Hwan, „North Korea‟s Denuclearisation: Are the Six-Party Talks Dead?‟, 52nd Annual Convention of 
the International Studies Association (Mar 2011), pp. 1-24. 
 
Kynge, James, China Shakes the World: The Rise of a Hungry Nation (London: Phoenix, 2009). 
 
Lee, Chin-Chuan (with Hongtao Li and Francis L. F. Lee), „Symbolic Use of Decisive Events: Tiananmen as a 
News Icon in the Editorials of the Elite US Press‟, International journal of Press/Politics, 16, no. 
3 (2011), pp. 335-56. 
 
Lee, Dong Ryul, „China‟s Policy and Influence on the North Korea nuclear Issue: Denuclearisation and/or 
stabilisation of the Korean Peninsula?‟, The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, 22, no. 2 (Jun 
2010), pp. 163-81. 
 
Li, Cheng, „China‟s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing up for 2012‟, China Leadership Monitor, no. 31 (2010), pp. 1-
24. 
 
Li, Shi, „Issues and Opportunities for Social Security Reform in China‟, China: An International Journal, 9, no. 
1 (Mar, 2011), pp. 72-109. 
 
Lim, Young Joon, „China‟s Media Regulations and Its Political Right to Enforce: Conflict with Foreign 
Correspondents‟, International Journal of Information and Communication Technology Research, 
1, no. 3 (Jul 2011), pp. 113-22. 
 
118 
 
MacKinnon, Rebecca, „Liberation Technology: China‟s “Networked Authoritarianism”‟, Journal of Democracy, 
22, no. 2 (Apr 2011), pp. 32-46.  
 
Mazza, Michael, „Chess on the High Seas: Dangerous times for US-China Relations‟, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, no. 3 (Aug 2010), pp. 1-8. 
 
Miller, Ken, „Coping with China‟s Financial Power: Beijing‟s Financial Foreign Policy‟, Foreign Affairs, 89, 
no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2010), pp. 96-109. 
 
Morrison, Wayne M. (and Marc Labonte), „China‟s Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues‟, 
Congressional Research Service (12 Jan, 2011), pp. 1-34.   
 
Naisbitt, John (and Doris Naisbitt), China‟s Megatrends: The 8 Pillars of a New Society (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2010). 
 
Nalwa, Preeti, „”Cheonan Epilogue: Prelude to the Sino-US Incompatibility on the South China Sea Dispute‟, 
Strategic Analysis, 35, no. 2 (Mar 2011), pp. 221-36. 
 
Naughton, Barry, „China‟s Economic Policy Today: The New State Activism‟, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 52, no. 3 (2011), pp. 313-29. 
 
Navarro, Peter (and Greg Autry), Death by China: Confronting the Dragon – A Global call to Action (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2011). 
 
Navarro, Peter, The Coming China Wars: Where They Will be Fought and How They Can be Won (New Jersey: 
FT Press, 2008). 
 
Page, Benjamin I. (and Tao Xie), „The Complexities of Economic Soft Power: The U.S.-China Case‟, in Sook 
Jong Lee and Jan Melissen, eds., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 223-46.  
119 
 
 
Potter, Pitman B., „4 June and Charter 08: Approaches to Remonstrance‟, China Information, 25, no. 2 (2011), 
pp. 121-38. 
 
Powles, Michael, „Perspective on Human Rights in China‟, New Zealand International Review, 36, no. 2 
(Mar/Apr 2011), pp. 2-5. 
 
Puddington, Arch, „The Freedom House Survey for 2010: Democracy under Duress‟, Journal of Democracy, 22, 
no. 2 (Apr 2011), pp. 17-31. 
 
Roach, Stephen S., „China‟s 12th Five Year Plan: Strategy vs. Tactics‟, Morgan Stanley (March, 2011), pp. 1-9. 
 
Roach, Stephen S., „The Politics of Trade Frictions‟, in Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy, eds., Debating 
China‟s exchange Rate Policy (Washington: Peterson Institute for international Economics, 
2008), pp. 234-38. 
 
Roth, Kenneth, „Empty Promises? Obama‟s Hesitant Embrace of human Rights‟, Foreign Affairs (Mar/Apr 
2010). 
 
Schreer, Benjamin (and Brendan Taylor), „The Korean Crises and Sino-American Rivalry‟, Survival, 53, no. 1 
(Feb/Mar 2011), pp. 13-19. 
 
Shirk, Susan, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 
Sigal, Leon V., „Primer – North Korea, South Korea, and the United States: Reading Between the Lines of the 
Cheonan Attack‟, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 66, no. 5 (2010), pp. 35-44. 
 
Smith, Terry, „Art of Dissent: Ai Weiwei‟, The Monthly (Jun 2011), pp. 58-59. 
 
120 
 
Snyder, Scott (and See-Won Byun), „Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: the Northeast Asian Response to North 
Korea‟s Provocations‟, The RUSI Journal, 156, no. 2 (Apr/May 2011), pp. 74-81. 
 
Storey, Ian, „Shangri-la Dialogues highlights Tensions in Sino-US Relations‟, China Brief, 10, no. 13 (Jun 
2010). 
 
Sung, Eun Kim, „How Publics Feel Toward the Rise of China?: A Comparative Study of Public Opinion in 
Japan, South Korea, and the US‟, Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association 
(February 2010), pp. 1-25. 
 
Swartz, Dale, „Jasmine in the Middle Kingdom: Autopsy of China‟s (Failed) Revolution‟, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, no. 1 (Apr 2011), pp. 1-5. 
 
Tao, Xie, U.S.-China Relations: China Policy on Capitol Hill (London: Routledge, 2009). 
 
Wolf Jr., Charles, „A Smarter Approach to the Yuan‟, Policy Review, no. 166 (April, 2011), pp. 1-8.  
 
Wu, Guogang, „China in 2009: Muddling Through Crises‟, Asian Survey, 50, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2010), pp. 25-39. 
 
Wu, Guogang, „China in 2010‟, Asian Survey, 51, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2011), pp. 18-32. 
 
Xiao, Qiang, „Liberation Technology: The Battle for the Chinese Internet‟, Journal of Democracy, 22, no. 2 
(Apr 2011), pp. 47-61. 
 
You, Ji, „Hedging Opportunities and Crises against Pyongyang‟s Hereditary Succession: A Chinese 
Perspective‟, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 20, no. 1 (2011), pp. 55-87. 
 
 
 
 
121 
 
Filmography 
 
 
US Department of State Video, Secretary Clinton Conducts Trilateral Meeting with South Korean and Japanese 
Foreign Ministers (Dec 2010), 28.02 minutes, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IbPW_hutTQY, 
viewed 19 May, 2011. 
 
The International Institute of Strategic Studies, IISS GSR 2011: Fourth Plenary Session - The Rise of a 
Militarised Asia: Global Implications (Sep 2011), 79.25 minutes, http://www.youtube.com/user/ 
IISSorg#p/ u/1/1fmwqJ-8Df4, viewed 25 September, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
